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Abstract
This Comment examines whether the Supreme Court in Barclays v. Franchise Tax Board,
correctly decided that the application of worldwide unitary taxation to non-U.S. parent groups
does not violate the Commerce Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1983 multinational corporations1 ("MNCs") suffered a
major setback in their legal campaign to invalidate worldwide
unitary taxation2 (or "WWCR") when the U.S. Supreme Court
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See Lewis B. Kaden, State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 32 CATH. U. L.
REv. 829 (1983) for a description of multinational corporations ("MNCs"). The mod-
em MNC is a far-flung enterprise, active in markets scattered throughout the world. Id.
at 831. MNC activities are usually directed from a central headquarters where strategic
decisions are made and communicated to units around the world. Id. The typical
MNC considers its diverse components part of a single global system whose overall suc-
cess, rather than that of the individual component, is considered critical. Id. Decisions
on the location of separate units are commonly based on a complex set of factors,
including financing, government relations, regulation, labor conditions, and marketing
opportunities. Id.; see also Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARv. L. Rxv. 1202, 1205 (1976) (stating that
MNC is "cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of com-
mon ownership and responsive to a common management").
2. J. William McArthur, Jr. & Kendall L. Houghton, In Barclays, U.S. Supreme Court
Finds for California, Which Was Banking On It, 81J. TAX'N 176, 178 (1994). Beginning in
the late 1970's MNCs initiated lawsuits in U.S. courts challenging worldwide unitary
taxation. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 447 U.S. 207; ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Tax'n and Rev. Dept, 458 U.S.
354 (1982).
Under worldwide unitary taxation, a MNC's income tax base is established by as-
sessing the income of all affiliated corporations, including the income of non-U.S. enti-
ties operating solely in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Marlis Carson & Douglas W. Briggs, Jr.,
U.S. Supreme Court Backs California in Barclays Dispute Over Unitary Method, 8 TAX NOTES
INT'L 1687 (June 27, 1994). The worldwide unitary taxation method assumes that a
MNC receives a pro rata share of the worldwide income generated by all business within
the corporate family. Id. A corporation's income tax base is the amount of the corpo-
ration's income subject to apportionment. JEROME HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLER-
STEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 1 7.02, 7.03, at 7-3 to 7-6 (2d ed. 1991). The U.S.
Supreme Court has defined worldwide unitary taxation in the following manner:
[Worldwide unitary taxation] calculates the local tax base by first defining the
scope of the "unitary business" of which the taxed enterprise's activities in the
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("Supreme Court" or "Court") held in Container Corp. of America
v. Franchise Tax Board3 that California's WWCR-based franchise
tax scheme did not violate the Commerce Clause.4 For those
states using worldwide unitary taxation, Container was less than
an absolute constitutional endorsement because the decision did
not complete the analysis of WWCR-based taxation under the
Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court in Container resolved
solely those Commerce Clause questions arising from the appli-
cation of worldwide unitary taxation to U.S. parent MNCs.5 The
Supreme Court in Container declined to decide whether the ap-
plication of worldwide unitary taxation to non-U.S. parent MNCs
would survive Commerce Clause review.6
Following the Container decisions non-U.S. parent MNCs ini-
taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then apportion[s] the total income of
that "unitary business" between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the
world on the basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the
corporation's activities within and without the jurisdiction.
Container Corp. v.'Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
3. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
4. Id. at 184-97. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
5. Container, 463 U.S. at 184.
6. Id. at 189 n.26. The Supreme Court stated that "[w]e have no need to address
in this opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with respect to state
taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with
either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Id. The Supreme Court similarly noted
later in its opinion that "[w]e recognize that the fact that the legal incidence of a tax
falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less signifi-
cant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need
not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter our analysis." Id. at 195
n.32. The possible constitutional analysis of this reserved question has been the subject
of several commentaries. See, e.g., Elizabeth Harris, Note, Desperate for Revenue: The
States' Unconstitutional Use of the Unitary Method to Apportion the Taxable Income of Foreign
Parent Corporations, 19 HASTNGS CONsT. L.Q. 1077 (1992) (concluding that use of uni-
tary taxation method to apportion state income tax liabilities of non-U.S. parent corpo-
rations with U.S. subsidiaries would violate Commerce Clause); Kevin M. Kohls, Note,
State Unitary Taxes Imposed on Foreign Based Multinational Groups: A Post Container Analysis,
31 WAYNE L. REv. 219 (1984) (concluding that Supreme Court would strike down state
worldwide unitary tax imposed on non-U.S. parent MNCs); Kirsten Schlenger, Note,
State Worldwide Unitary Taxation: The Foreign Parent Case, 23 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445
(1985) (arguing that policy considerations as well as case law prohibits application of
worldwide unitary taxation to non-U.S. parent MNCs); Douglas M. Ventura, Note, State
Unitary Business: Are Multinational Corporations Being Subjected to an Unconstitutional Tax,
21 SAN DiEGo L. Rxv. 879 (1984) (concluding that worldwide unitary taxation when
applied to non-U.S. parent MNCs violates the negative implications of the Commerce
Clause).
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tiated litigation in federal court challenging worldwide unitary
taxation and also began a concerted political campaign at the
state and federal levels to force a resolution of the worldwide
unitary taxation dispute. The MNCs' legal efforts were initially
unsuccessful because of procedural obstacles, which prevented
them from gaining standing in federal court.7 The reserved is-
sue on worldwide unitary taxation was finally presented for adju-
dication on the merits before the Supreme Court when review
was granted in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of Califor-
7. See, e.g., Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1012 (1983); EMI Ltd. v. Bennet, 738 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073
(1984). In Shell Petroleum, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Shell Petroleum, an
Anglo-Dutch MNC involved in the petroleum business, had standing to bring a share-
holder derivative suit on behalf of its California subsidiaries challenging California's
WWCR-based franchise tax scheme. Shell, 709 F.2d at 596. The Ninth Circuit decided
that Shell could not maintain a shareholder derivative suit because it had failed to
demonstrate a personal and direct injury, and was thus precluded from challenging the
California tax. Id. In EMI Ltd., the Second Circuit used substantially the same reason-
ing to also dismiss on standing grounds a non-U.S. parent MNC suit challenging Cali-
fornia's worldwide unitary taxation scheme. EMI, 738 F.2d at 997.
The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to follow the Ninth and Second Circuits in
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 493 U.S. 331
(1988). In Alcan, the Seventh Circuit analyzed whether a non-U.S. parent MNC had
standing to bring suit in federal court for an injunction and declaratory judgment to
invalidate under the Commerce Clause the apportionment of the income of its Califor-
nia subsidiaries under a California worldwide unitary tax scheme. Id. at 690-91. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that the shareholder-standing rule did not operate as a pro-
cedural restriction barring Alcan's claim because the subsidiary was an instrumentality
of Alcan's multinational business activities. Id. at 697. Since the California tax re-
stricted the parent's ability to control the conduct of international business by its Cali-
fornia subsidiaries, it suffered a distinct and personal injury. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided that Alcan's suit fell within the constitu-
tional parameters of an Article III "case or controversy" because the California method
"threaten [ed] to cause actual financial injury to Alcan... under Article III by illegally
reducing the return on [its] investment." Alcan, 493 U.S. at 336. Nevertheless the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and considered it unnecessary to reach the
question of whether non-U.S. parent MNCs could meet the prudential requirements of
the standing doctrine because the claim was infirm under the Tax Injunction Act. The
Tax Injunction Act provides that "the district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or re-
strain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of the state." Id. (quoting Tax Injunc-
tion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)). For a discussion of the standing issue see, Note,
Standing Under Commercial Treaties: Foreign Holding Companies and the Unitary Tax, 97
HARV, L. REv. 1894 (1984) (arguing that federal courts should grant non-U.S. parent
MNCs standing to challenge unitary taxation); Diane M. Parker, Note, Unitay Tax Liti-
gation After Alcan: What Options Remain for Foreign Parent Companies, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 125
(1991) (arguing that federal courts have correctly concluded that non-U.S. parent
MNCs lack standing to challenge state unitary taxation schemes).
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nia.8 The Barclays case was before the Supreme Court on appeal
from a lawsuit challenging WWCR-based taxation initiated in
California state court.9 The Supreme Court handed down its de-
cision in Barclays on June 20, 1994.10 The Supreme Court held
in Barclays that the application of worldwide unitary taxation to
non-U.S. parent MNCs was constitutionally indistinguishable
from its application to U.S. parent MNCs and thus did not trans-
gress Commerce Clause principles." In contrast to their unsuc-
cesful legal campaign, 2 the MNCs' political effort to force a res-
olution of the worldwide unitary taxation dispute was largely suc-
cessful and forced WWCR states to modify their corporate
income tax'schemes in ways that mitigated the controversial as-
pects of WWCR-based taxation.13
The final political resolution of the reserved WWCR issue
has significant domestic and international implications. First,
Barclays resolves questions regarding several billion dollars in tax
revenues and thus has important budgertary consequences for
the states.14 Second, the result in the Barclays case implicates
8. 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993). The following entities filed amius briefs in the Barclays
Supreme Court litigation: State of New Mexico; State of North Dakota; State of Alaska;
Banque Nationale de Paris; California Legislature; California Tax Reform Association;
Citizens for Tax Justice; Committee on State Taxation; Confederation of British Indus-
try; Congressman Don Edwards; Council of State Governments; European Community
Members; Federation of German Industry; Japan Tax Association; Keidanren (Japan
Federation); Member States of the European Community; Multi-State Tax Commission;
Organization for International Investment, Inc.; Reuters Limited; Senator Byron L.
Dorgan; United Kingdom (on petition for certiorari); United Kingdom (on the merits);
United States; Washington Legal Foundation. John Turro, U.S. Supreme Court a Hard
Sell for Barclays/Colgate Unitary Cases, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 903, 905-06 (Apr. 4, 1994).
9. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., Nos. 325059 & 325061 (Super. Ct.,
Sacramento Cty, 1990), aff'd, Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal.
Rptr. 626 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 202
(1992). The California Supreme Court remanded the Barclays matter to the California
Court of Appeal for further consideration. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2278 (1994).
10. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
11. Id. at 2276.
12. McArthur & Houghton, supra note 2, at 179.
13. Id.
14. See Unitary Taxes: Clinton Meets California Tax Board Chairman on "Barclays" Uni-
tary Tax Case, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at D-19 (May 19, 1993). Brad Sherman, the
Chairman of the California Equalization Board, estimated that California could loose
upto US$4 billion in revenues if the U.S. Supreme Court found worldwide unitary taxa-
tion unconstitutional. Id. California's revenue losses from an adverse decision in Bar-
clays for the 1994 and 1995 tax years were expected to exceed US$2 billion. Unitary
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issues relating to future commercial relations between the
United States and its international trading and investment part-
ners.15 Finally, the Barclays decision modifies the framework for
future judicial review of state taxation under the Commerce
Clause.1 6
This Comment examines whether the Supreme Court in
Barclays correctly decided that the application of worldwide uni-
tary taxation to non-U.S. parent groups does not violate the
Commerce Clause. Part I describes the worldwide unitary taxa-
tion method, and separate accounting, the primary alternative
available to states imposing corporate income taxes. Next, Part I
analyzes the worldwide unitary taxation controversy and sets
forth the Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation. Fi-
nally, Part I discusses the Container decision in which the
Supreme Court upheld the application of worldwide unitary tax-
ation to U.S. parent corporate groups. Part II describes the deci-
sions of the California state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court
in Barclays. Part III argues that the Supreme Court correctly de-
cided the non-U.S. parent MNC issue in Barclays. Part III also
Taxes: California Awaits Administration's Amicus Brief in "Barclays" Case, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 231, at D-6 (Dec. 3, 1993). More specifically, the Franchise Tax Board ex-
pected that upto US$303 million in refunds would have to be given to Barclays Bank
PLC and other non-U.S. parent MNCs if Barclays' Commerce Clause challenge was sus-
tained. Unitary Tax: California Asks for Review of Decision Finding Unitary Tax Unconstitu-
tional, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at G-3 (Jan. 11, 1991). An additional US$223 mil-
lion in uncollected income also depended on the case's outcome. Id.
15. See, e.g., John Turro, German Finance Committee Warns White House Against Sup-
porting California's Unitary Tax Method, 7 TAx NOTES INT'L 165 (July 19, 1993). AJuly 1,
1993 resolution of the Finance Committee of the German Bundestag called on the
Clinton administration to oppose California's use of worldwide unitary taxation. Id.
The Committee's intent was to put pressure on the Clinton administration not to sup-
port California in the Barclays case. Id. The Committee resolution added that the re-
tention by California of worldwide unitary taxation would seriously prejudice economic
relations between the Germany and the United States. Id.; see also Michael I. Goodbee,
The British Threat to Retaliate Against the Unitary Method of Taxation, 7 TAx NOTES INT'L
538, 538 (Aug. 23, 1993). On May 13, 1993 the U.K Chancellor of the Exchequer
threatened that if a satisfactory resolution to the worldwide unitary taxation dispute was
not reached, the United Kingdom would have to take retaliatory action. Id. The
threatened U.K's retaliatory actions included the withdrawl of tax refunds from U.S.
corporations of under the U.S.-U.K. income tax treaty. Id. at 540. In May 1993, Christi-
ane Scrivener, European Community Tax Commissioner, stated that U.S. corporations
doing business in the European Union would be subject to retaliatory taxation if the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld California's use of worldwide unitary taxation. EC Tax
Commissioner Warns of Retaliation if California Unitary Tax System is Upheld, DAILY TAx REP.
(BNA) No. 90, at G-1 (May 12, 1993).
16. McArthur & Houghton, supra note 2, at 178.
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argues that after Barclays, taxpayers face a heightened burden in
demonstrating that state taxes violate the Commerce Clause and
that the states are unlikely to embrace worldwide unitary taxa-
tion even though the Commerce Clause no longer constitutes an
obstacle. This Comment concludes that with Barclays, the
Supreme Court has completed the constitutional analysis of
worldwide unitary taxation under the Commerce Clause.
I. WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION AND COMMERCE
CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAX POWER
Dividing the income of a corporation engaging in interstate
or international business between taxing jurisdictions is a highly
controversial and complex aspect of state tax administration. t7
The sophistication of modern business has contributed to the
complexity of the apportionment process.18 While historically,
the states of the United States used the separate accounting
method for division of income purposes, 19 because of the per-
ceived shortcomings of separate accounting,20 the states adopted
the unitary taxation method beginning in the 1930's.2 1 Later in
the 1970's several states adopted a particular variation of unitary
taxation called worldwide unitary taxation. Few controversies
concerning U.S. tax policy have generated as much controversy
as worldwide unitary taxation. 23 From the late 1970's onwards
MNCs engaged in a sustained legal campaign to invalidate world-
17. PAULJ. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOcAL TAXATION, 1 9:16,
at 521 (1981).
18. STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 8.01, at 8-4. Developments that
have contributed to the increasing complexity of modern national and international
business include: (1) the size and international scope of business operations; (2) ad-
vances in business form and organization, operation, and structure; (3) diversification;
(4) increasing use ofjurisdictionally separate affiliates to own and operate business; (5)
increases in income from intangible property; (6) treatment of corporations as legally
distinct entities notwithstanding control and ownership rights; (7) technological
changes in business; (8) different methods of control by multinational corporations
over their operating divisions and affiliates. William D. Dexter, Attribution of a Multina-
tional Corporation's Net Income: The Position of the Unitary States Regarding Combined Report-
ing, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 311, 314 (1985).
19. STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 8.03, at 8-28.
20. Id.
21. Id. 8.03, at 8-29.
22. Thomas C. Pearson, State Taxation of Foreign Source Income Through Worldwide
Combined Reporting, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 99 (1983).
23. Nicholas S. Freud & Walter M. Kolligs, US. Suprme Court Upholds Worldwide
Reporting and Unitary Taxation, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 340, 356 (Aug. 1994).
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wide unitary taxation, predicated on the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.2 4 Although MNC Commerce Clause argu-
ments failed in 1983 in Container, the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that the application of worldwide unitary taxation
to non-U.S parent MNCs with U.S. subsidiaries might not pass
Commerce Clause scrutiny.25
A. Apportioning Multijurisdictional Corporate Income: Separate
Accounting, Unitary Taxation, and the Worldwide Unitary
Taxation Controversy
When a state seeks to tax the net income of a corporation
operating across tax frontiers, as a threshold matter it must de-
vise a taxation mechanism that identifies a portion of net in-
come attributable to the corporation's activities conducted
within the state. 26 Two primary alternatives are available for ap-
portioning multijurisdictional corporate income: separate ac-
counting and unitary taxation. 27 Worldwide unitary taxation is a
24. See supra note 2 (citing cases where MNCs have brought Commerce Clause
challenges to worldwide unitary taxation).
25. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 453 U.S. 159, 189 n.26, 195 n.32 (1983).
26. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 9:16, at 521. Net income is the "end product of the
numerous intermingled transactions and operating events conducted by a taxpayer
within an arbitrary time period called a taxable year." Dexter, supra note 18, at 313.
For tax purposes, net income is classified as an intangible, giving multiple jurisdictions
the legal right to tax the same income. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 9:2, at 462. State
corporate income taxes or income-based taxes can broadly be divided into two catego-
ries: (1) excise taxes imposed for doing business within the state or for holding a li-
cense for doing business within the state, and (2) taxes on net income that originates in
the state. STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 7.01, at 7-1 to 7-2. Excise taxes
are commonly referred to as "franchise" taxes. Id. Taxes on net income are commonly
referred to as "direct net income" taxes. Id.
Income and income-based taxes were first used by the states in the 1840's when
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Alabama, Florida, and North Carolina, adopted in-
come based fiscal measures as a source of revenue. David M. Hudson & Daniel C.
Turner, International and Interstate Approaches to Taxing Business Income, 6 Nw. J. INtr'L L.
& Bus. 562, 582 (1984). Under the financial pressures of the Civil War (1860-65) six
other states also turned to corporate income taxes, including Georgia, Missouri, Texas,
Louisiana, West Virginia, and Kentucky. Id. at 582-83. Wisconsin imposed the first
modem income tax in 1911 with graduated rates on personal and corporate income.
Id. at 584. Wisconsin was soon followed by other states so that by the 1930's a majority
of states were using corporate income taxes, either as direct taxes on income or as
indirect excise taxes measured by income. Id.
27. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 9:16, at 521-24. A third method, specific allocation,
is also used to apportion corporate net income for tax purposes. Id. Under the specific
allocation method, business income is identified with a specific geographic source and
confers on the source state the right to tax that income. STATE AND LOCAL TAxATION,
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refinement of the unitary taxation method,28 which although
only used by a minority of states,29 has generated intense opposi-
tion from both U.S and non-U.S. parent MNCs.3 °
1. Separate Accounting
Historically, the separate accounting method was used by
the states to apportion the income of both multi-state and mul-
tinational businesses.3 ' Under separate accounting, the in-state
activities of an MNC are separated from its overall business activi-
ties and then the net income attributable to those in-state activi-
ties are established.3 2 Because the taxed entity is considered sep-
arate from its affiliates and subsidiaries, attributable income is
established without reference to the financial performance of
the taxpayer's businesses operating in other jurisdictions. 33 The
value and profits of an entity's in-state activities are determined
by reference to its own accounting records, and the taxing juris-
diction may tax only the income reflected by those separate ac-
counts.8 4 To ensure that multi-entity businesses operating across
tax boundaries do not use the transfer pricing mechanism to
shift income into low tax jurisdictions,3 5 under the separate ac-
supra note 2, 8.04, at 8-34 to 8-36. Statutory provisions usually specify the source
jurisdiction for a particular item of income. Id. The specific allocation method is con-
fined by states that use it for apportioning income derived from real and tangible prop-
erty, such as the rental income. Id. Thus, Royalties payable for oil and mineral recov-
ery are attributed to the jurisdiction in which the real property or the natural resource
is located. Id. Income from intangible property is typically allocated to the taxpayer's
commercial domicile or in some cases to the state in which the intangible is utilized. Id.
Thus, a state may allocate interest and dividend income to the taxpayer's commercial
domicile, but income from patents and copyright may be attributed to the state where
they are utilized. Id.
28. Pearson, supra note 22, at 110-15.
29. Id. 99 nn.21, 22 & 23.
30. Id. at 122-29.
31. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 1 8.03, at 8-28.
32. Id.
33. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 9:17, at 522.
34. Id.
35. See Dean M. Weiner, Transfer Pricing: Determining a Safe Haven Price, 2 FLETCHER
FORUM 179 (1976). A transfer price is the price charged for inter-corporate transfers of
goods, technology, services, or other items. Id. Transfer pricing involves transactions
in which related affiliates of a single enterprise located in different tax jurisdictions
allocate the total income of the enterprise between taxing jurisdictions, and directly
affect the net income of both the sending and receiving units. Id. By using transfer
pricing, MNCs can also differ recording the value added to a good by each production
unit until that good reaches the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rates. Id.
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counting method transactions between affiliated entities are
deemed to occur at "arm's length" prices. 6
2. Unitary Taxation
An alternate method available to the states for apportioning
multi-state or multinational income is unitary taxation,37 first
used over a century ago by the states to tax interstate utilities,38
and presently used by all states imposing corporate income
taxes.3 1 Unlike the separate accounting method, unitary taxa-
tion does not purport to identify the exact geographical source
of an enterprise's profits.4 ° The premise of unitary taxation is
36. Id. at 182. "Arm's length" prices are prices equal to those charged unrelated
firms. Id.
37. STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 8.05, at 8-36.
38. Id. 8.05, at 8-36. The states developed unitary taxation at the turn of the
century as an ad valorem property tax for interstate utility systems and railroads. Id.
Under the "unit rule," the value of a railroad or utility was treated as a function of the
interstate system as a whole. Id. Therefore, a formula was applied to apportion the
income of the entire railway or utility as a unit between the jurisdictions in which it
operated. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the states' application of the "unit rule" in Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897). In Adams Express the Supreme
Court agreed with the states that a tax purely on the tangible property of a railroad
used within its borders did not represent the true value of a utility's activities within any
particular state:
No more reason is perceived for limiting the valuation of the property of
express companies to horses, wagons and furniture, than that of railroad, tele-
graph and sleeping car companies, to roadbeds, rails and ties; poles and wires;
or cars. The unit is a unit of use and management, and the horses, wagons,
safes, pouches and furniture; the contracts for transportation facilities; the
capital necessary to carry on the business, whether represented in tangible or
intangible property... [possess] a value in combination and from use in con-
nection with the property and capital elsewhere, which [can] as rightfully be
recognized in the assessment for taxation in the instance of these companies
as the others.
We repeat that while the unity which exists may not be a physical unity, it
is something more than a mere unity of ownership. It is a unity of use, not
simply for the convenience or pecuniary profit of the owner, but existing in
the very necessity of the case - resulting from the very nature of the business.
Id. at 221-22. The unit rule is the theoretical progenitor for modern unitary taxation.
STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 8.05, at 8-38.
39. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 9:18, at 523. California pioneered the use of the
unitary method for apportioning business income in the 1930's. Pearson, supra note
22, at 95, 99 n.20. Altogether 45 states use the unitary method to apportion corporate
income. REVIEW OF THE UNITARY METHOD OF TAxATON: HEARINGS ON S. 1113 AND S.
1974 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TAXATION AND DEBT MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON FINANCE, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
40. HARTMAN, supra note 17, 9:18, at 523.
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that the total income of an enterprise results from certain in-
come producing factors. 41 The assumption continues that in-
come produced by the combination of those faciors has its
source where those income producing factors are located.
4 2
In order to compute the income tax base, unitary taxation
first defines the unitary business of which the taxed entity forms
a part.43 The most common definition of a unitary business44
states that a unitary business includes all affiliated enterprises
that share common ownership, common management, and com-
mon operations.4 5 Next unitary taxation requires the taxpayer
to combine the net income of the entire group of related enter-
prises and to submit a single consolidated net income report,
which represents the taxpayer's apportionable tax base. 46 Fi-
nally, the income of the unitary business is apportioned by apply-
ing a formula that allocates a fair share of the unitary business'
consolidated income to the taxing jurisdiction.47 Most states us-
ing unitary taxation employ a standard three-factor formula
based on a unitary business' interest in state property, payroll,
and sales as compared to its total property, payroll, and sales.48
Generally, each factor within an apportionment formula is
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. STATE AND LocAL TAxATION, supra note 2, 8.11, at 8-76.
45. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P.2d 334,341 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
For treatments of the unitary business concept, see STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra
note 2, 1 8.11-12, at 8-76 to 8-111; see also C. Douglas Floyd, The "Unitary" Business in
State Taxation: Confusion at the Supreme Court?, 82 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 469 (1982) (argu-
ing that unitary businesses can be classified into three major categories and that almost
all cases on the unitary business principle reflect one of those three types); E. George
Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated
Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. RIv. 171 (1970) (critically examining unitary business prin-
ciple). For a treatment of the unitary business principle by a student author, see Brian
J. Isaac, Note, State Taxation of Multinationals and the Unitary Business Concept: A Contempo-
rary View, 10 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 115 (1984) (examining problems faced by states in
taxing income generated by activities of MNCs through critical analysis of the unitary
business principle).
46. Pearson, supra note 22, at 96.
47. HAITMAN, supra note 17, § 9:18, at 523.
48. Id. § 9:18, at 523-24. For example, assume first that the total multinational
income of Corporation X's unitary business is US$100,000 and the percentage of prop-
erty, payroll, and sales represented by Subsidiary XY, Corporation X's subsidiary in uni-
tary tax State Y, is 27.5%, 15%, and 2.5% respectively. In this case the average State Y
percentage of Corporation X's total property, payroll, and sales is 15%. Fifteen percent
of US$100,000, or US$15,000, will be the figure on which State Ys taxing authority will
assess Subsidiary XY's corporate income tax.
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equally weighted.4 9
Under worldwide unitary taxation, which is a variation of
the unitary taxation method, a taxpayer is required to consoli-
date the income of all enterprises throughout the world that
comprise a part of its unitary business.50 Thus, U.S.-parent
MNCs can be required to include in the apportionable tax base
the non-U.S. income of non-U.S. affiliates that are part of its uni-
tary business.5 1 Similarly, the U.S. subsidiary of a non-U.S. par-
ent MNC can be required to include the non-U.S. income of its
49. Pearson, supra note 22, at 112. Some states, however, assign a 50% weight to
the sales factor and 25% weight to both the property and payroll factors. Id. By chang-
ing the relative weight of each factor within the apportionment formula a state effec-
tively lowers income taxes for local businesses that export products and increases taxes
for out-of-state businesses that produce goods that are sold in the taxing state. Id. By
increasing the weight of the sales factor, states provide an incentive for out-of-state busi-
nesses to relocate in the taxing state. Id.
Much of the prevailing non-uniformity between state apportionment formulae can
be ascribed to the pursuit of economic self-interest by the states. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM.
ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
STATE TAXATION ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 123
(1964) (stating that "[tihe formulae presently employed by the various states were en-
acted by state legislatures for revenue purposes only, and without thought to uniformity
with the laws of other states" and that "[flactors of formulae, and the components
thereof have been weighted to meet local interests peculiar to the state, and with no
interstate cooperation in view [which] has resulted in many inequities, some of gross
proportions").
50. Pearson, supra note 22, at 112. Worldwide unitary taxation is also referred to
as "Worldwide Combined Reporting" or "Total Worldwide Combination." A.W.
Grumwell et al., Worldwide Unitary Tax: Is it Invalid Under the Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, 18 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 695, 705 (1986). Certain other varia-
tions on the scope of income reporting are employed by states using unitary taxation.
Id. Under "Domestic Worldwide Combined Reporting" or "Domestic Worldwide Com-
bination," subsidiaries and parent corporations located outside the U.S. which are not
involved in any U.S. business are automatically excluded from the reporting require-
ment. Id. A third form of unitary taxation reporting known as "Domestic Combined
Accounting" includes in the apportionable tax base only the income of U.S. businesses.
Id. at 707. This method effectively limits includible income to profits only of U.S. affili-
ates. Id. This restricted form of income combination falls within the parameters of the
"water's edge" unitary taxation method. Id.
California was among the first states to use worldwide unitary taxation when it ex-
tended its unitary taxation method to worldwide operations in the early 1970's. Pear-
son, supra note 22, at 99 n.20. Oregon adopted the unitary taxation method in the
1955 and applied it to the worldwide operations of MNCs in the early 1960's. Id. at 99,
n.21. In 1984, upto twelve states used worldwide unitary taxation including, California,
Oregon, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, and Utah. Id. at 99 nn.20, 21 & 23. New York abandoned the use of
worldwide unitary taxation for multinational oil companies in 1983. Id. at 99 n.25.
51. Pearson supra note 22, at 112.
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non-U.S. parent and affiliates.12 Worldwide unitary taxation
constitutes the most expansive assertion by the states of the uni-
tary taxation method. 3
3. The Worldwide Unitary Taxation Controversy
The use of worldwide unitary taxation to determine and dis-
tribute the net income of an MNC operating among several tax-
ing jurisdictions has generated opposition from MNC taxpayers
because they argue it grossly distorts income allocation.54 MNCs
argue that to the extent that income overallocated to one juris-
diction is also taxed by another jurisdiction, they are systemati-
cally subjected to international multiple taxation.55 Non-U.S.
MNCs additionally argue that worldwide unitary taxation re-
quires making adjustments to international accounting records
to comply with U.S. accounting principles, including aggregat-
ing the income of international subsidiaries, translating data
from other languages, and converting non-U.S. financial state-
ments into U.S. dollars.56 In their view, meeting the costs of
these adjustments unfairly burdens non-U.S. businesses and spe-
cifically provides a competitive advantage to U.S. parent MNCs
that maintain their accounting records in WWCR-compatible
format.5 7
States that use worldwide unitary taxation respond that
WWCR-based taxation is fairer and more efficient method by
which to apportion multijurisdictional corporate income." Spe-
cifically, separate accounting, the primary alternative to unitary
taxation, allows MNCs to evade income tax liabilities by dis-
torting prices of intra-corporate transfers to shift income into
low tax jurisdictions. 59 Establishing "arm's length" prices for in-
tra-corporate transfers does not mitigate the problem of tax eva-
sion in their view.6° In most cases there are no uncontrolled
52. Id.
53. Grumwell et al., supra note 50, at 705.
54. Pearson, supra note 22, at 123-24.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. STATE AND LocAL TAXATION, supra note 2, at 18.03, at 8-29-32; see supra notes
35-36 (describing transfer pricing mechanism).
59. Id.
60. STATE AND LocAL TAXAnON, supra note 2, 8.03, at 8-29-31.
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sales61 within a corporate group against which to compare partic-
ular transfers. 62 It thus becomes necessary to construct "arm's
length" prices by comparing equivalent transactions in the open
market or by estimating the costs of the goods or services in
question and adding a reasonable profit.6' Usually, however,
there exists no comparable market data.64 Similarly, attempting
to establish "arm's length" prices by adding a reasonable profit
to the manufacturing price is often impracticable because it is
difficult to estimate manufacturing costs and reasonable profit
margins.65 Second, maintaining separate accounting records for
taxpayers in a format that provides adequate data to establish its
separate tax liabilities is prohibitively expensive.66 Finally, the
unitary tax states argue that separate accounting bears little con-
nection to the realities of modern business activity because it
fails to recognize that MNCs are operationally centralized and
net income is the outcome of integrated economic activity.67
B. Commerce Clause Limitations on State Taxation
State discretion to devise corporate tax schemes taxing in-
come earned in interstate or international commerce, while rec-
ognized as extensive," is limited in important respects by the
Commerce Clause of the U.S Constitution.69 Commerce Clause
measures adopted by the federal government overide any state
measures with which they conflict under the Supremacy
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Professors Jerome Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein state that:
[Separate accounting] operates in a universe of pretense; as in Alice in Won-
derland, it turns reality into fancy, and pretends that it's in the real world. For
the essence of the separate accounting technique of dividing the income of a
unitary business is to ignore the interdependence and integration of the busi-
ness operations... and treat them, instead, as if they were separate, interde-
pendent, and non-integrated. The difference between.., separate businesses
and the national and multinational unitary businesses that dominate our econ-
omy are crucial. Indeed, and to considerable extent the wealth, power, and
profits of gargantuan enterprises are attributable to the very fact that they are
integrated, unitary businesses.
Id. 8.03, at 8-31 to 8-32.
68. HArrMAN, supra note 17, 1:1, at 1-2.
69. Id. 1 2:2, at 14-19.
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Clause.y° Given the absence generally of congressional regula-
tion limiting state taxation, however,71 the restrictions issuing
from the "dormant" Commerce Clause have operated more ex-
tensively to restrict state taxation.7" Under the "dormant" Com-
merce Clause doctrine the Supreme Court has established stan-
dards for reviewing state tax schemes to ensure that they do not
unduly burden interstate and international commerce.7 3  In
Container the Supreme Court reviewed worldwide unitary taxa-
tion under the "dormant" Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Clause tests but found that WWCR-based taxation was not un-
constitutional. 4
1. The Commerce Clause
The U.S. states generally have extensive discretion in exer-
cising their taxation power under the U.S. federal system. 75 The
U.S. Constitution, however, places important restrictions on
state taxation. 76 Primary among them are the Commerce Clause
70. Id.
71. Id. 13:1, at 677-78.
72. Id. 2:2, at 17-18.
73. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (case establish-
ing modem Interstate Commerce Clause review of state tax schemes); Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (case establishing Foreign Commerce
Clause review of state taxation schemes).
74. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
75. HARTmAN, supra note 17, 1:1, at 1-2; see Wisconsin v.J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S.
435, 444 (1940). InJC. Penney the Supreme Court stated that:
The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of states strict obser-
vance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing in their exercise
of the most basic power of government, that of taxation.... A state is free to
pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the
practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to oppor-
tunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits
which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly civilized society.
Id.
76. HARTMAN, supra note 17, 1.1, at 6. The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment has figured as prominently in worldwide unitary tax litigation as the
Commerce Clause. Id. The Due Process Clause states that "nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, cl. 1.
The Due Process Clause restricts the incidence of state taxation of interstate or
international commerce to the benefits the state has conferred on the taxpayer. See,
e.g., JC, Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444 ("The test is whether property was taken without
due process of law, or ... whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal
relations to protection, opportunities, and benefits given by the state. The simple but
controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask some-
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limitations placed on the states' power to tax interstate or inter-
national commerce.77
First, the Commerce Clause restricts state taxes that conflict
thing in return."). At a minimum the Supreme Court's case law requires a factual con-
nection between the state and the value it seeks to tax. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978) (stating that Due Process requires that there exist "some
definite link, some minimum connection, between the state and the person, property,
or transaction it seeks to tax") (citing Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954)).
In the context of worldwide unitary tax litigation, Due Process nexus requirements
have most prominently been implicated over questions as to the scope of a unitary
business. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980) (stat-
ing that "[t]he linchpin of apportionablility in the field of state income taxation is the
unitary business principle"). The Supreme Court's case law has not provided a coher-
ent framework for establishing the constitutional parameters of a unitary business. See,
e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, Part II:
Reflections on ASARCO and Woolworth, 81 MICH. L. REv. 157, 183-84 (1982) (concluding
that Supreme Court's case law provides no principled basis for ascertaining the exist-
ence of unitary business and that "unitary business in the end may simply be something
the Court knows when it sees it"). Generally, however, the focus is on the "underlying
economic realities" of the business as a whole to determine whether the members of a
business group are really "discrete business enterprise[s]" or whether they are a unitary
business. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 440-41. The Supreme Court gives the states significant
leeway in defining the scope of a unitary business. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 9:24, at
537.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause as additionally requir-
ing a "rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intra-
state values of the enterprise." Moorman, 437 U.S. at 272-73 (1978) (citing Miller Bros.
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). The rational relationship requirement is
fulfilled if the unitary tax is both "internally" and "externally" consistent. Container, 463
U.S. at 169. An apportionment formula is "internally consistent" if it does not result in
the taxation of extraterritorial values. Id. However, an apportionment formula will not
be invalidated simply because it results in the taxation of some income that does not
have its source in the taxing state. Id. at 169-70. External consistency exists when "the
factor or factors used in an apportionment formula [ ] actually reflects in a reasonable
sense [ ] how income is generated." Id. The Supreme Court has upheld state unitary
taxes against unconstitutional distortion arguments almost without exception. See Je-
rome R. Hellerstein, State Taxation under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29
VAMN. L. Rav. 335, 348 (1976) (stating that "taxpayers face a seldom surmountable
burden in overcoming the presumption of the validity of state apportionment," and
that "courts are reluctant to disturb administration by state tax administrators of mod-
em, multifactor apportionment formulas"). In only one case to date has a unitary tax
been invalidated on grounds that the income attributed to the state lacked a rational
relationship to the business' in-state activities. See Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina,
283 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1931) (holding that North Carolina corporate income tax statute
"operated unreasonably and arbitrarily, in attributing to state a percentage of income
out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in that
State").
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power,
"[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states." Id.
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with any federal measure regulating interstate or international
commerce. 78 Preemption occurs in cases of conflict because the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution affirmatively grants
Congress the authority to regulate interstate and international
commerce.79 Under the Supremacy Clause, when Congress acts
within the scope of its expressly delegated commerce authority,
any conflicting state fiscal measure is preempted by the federal
measure.
8 0
The Commerce Clause also operates to restrict state taxa-
tion on interstate or international commerce under the "dor-
mant" Commerce Clause doctrine."1 The U.S. Constitution, sub-
ject to one narrow exception under the Import-Export Clause,"2
provides no overt textual limitations on the state tax power.83
Moreover, with few exceptions, Congress has declined to exer-
cise its authority under the Commerce Clause to limit state taxa-
tion. 4 Recognizing that myopic state tax policies can have detri-
78. HARTMAN, supra note 17, 2:2, at 14-19.
79. Id.
80. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states that "the Laws of the
United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.; see JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrruTIONAL LAw § 8.1, at 274 (3d ed. 1991) (stating that
.when a state regulation conflicts with federal legislation enacted under the commerce
clause, the federal statute controls pursuant to the supremacy clause."); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-25, at 479 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "so
long as Congress acts within an area delegated to it, the preemption of conflicting state
or local action . . . flow directly from the substantive source of power of the congres-
sional action coupled with the supremacy clause article IV"); STATE AND LOCAL TAXA-
TION, supra note 2, 4.15, at 4-111 (stating that "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, State action that conflicts with a valid exercise of Congressional power
must give way [and clonsequently, State taxes on interstate or foreign commerce that
conflict with Federal legislation, enacted pursuant to the grant to Congress of the
power to regulate the commerce, are invalid").
81. HARTMAN, supra note 17, 2:2, at 17-18.
82. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. State power to tax foreign commerce is limited
by the Import-Export Clause, which states that "[n]o state shall, without the consent of
the Congress, apply any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws." Id. The Export-Import Clause
could potentially have served as an important limitation on state taxes on interstate
commerce. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two
Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAw. 37, 39 (1987) [hereinafter Two Cen-
turies]. Since the late 19th century, however, the Import-Export Clause has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court as having no application to commerce among the states.
Id. (citing Woodruff v. Parnham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868)).
83. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 80, § 8.1, at 274; TRIBE, supra note 80, § 6.2, at
403.
84. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 13.1, at 677-78. Before 1959 Congress had declined
to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to legislate in the state tax field.
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mental economic consequences for the states and ultimately the
nation as a whole,85 the U.S. Supreme Court for over a century
has interpreted the Commerce Clause as limiting by its own
force state taxes that threaten interstate or international com-
merce.86 The judicial branch has thus assumed the role of polic-
ing state fiscal conduct to protect the larger commercial inter-
ests of the United States under the "dormant" Commerce Clause
doctrine.87
Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on
Mobi Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113, 113 n.3 (1980). In 1959 Congress
for the first time passed legislation limiting the states' power to tax interstate com-
merce. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring minimum threshold
of intrastate activity that must be exceeded by out-of-state corporation before state can
impose income or income based tax). Since 1959 Congresshas on five additional occa-
sions enacted legislation restricting state taxation of interstate commerce. State Income
Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations, supra at 113 n.3. In each of these cases the
legislation was narrow in scope. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohib-
iting state taxation on electrical energy discriminating against out-of-state purchasers);
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting state stock transfer taxes when
only nexus between transaction and state is presence of transfer agent); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1513 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting state taxes in connection with transportation
of persons in air commerce); 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting
states from imposing tax on railroad property more burdensome than on industrial or
commercial property); 49 U.S.C. § 11503a (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting state
taxes on motor carrier property more burdensome than industrial or commercial prop-
erty).
85. See HARTmAN, supra note 17, § 1:1, at 2 (stating that "[t]he existence of myopic
state tax policies can be destructive of harmonious coordination of political power be-
tween the Nation and state governments at home, plus the impairment of uniform fed-
eral policy in the commercial and political relations abroad [and a]dditionally, such
harmful state policies could curtail optimum national economic development").
86. See Two Centuries, supra note 82, at 43-44; see also Wardair Canada v. Florida
Dept. of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986). In Wardair the Supreme Court stated that:
[W]e have acknowledged the self-executing nature of the Commerce Clause
and held on countless occasions that, even in the absence of specific action
taken by the Federal Government to disapprove of state regulation that is con-
trary to the constitutional principle in ensuring that the conduct of individual
States does not work to the detriment of the Nation as a whole, and thus ulti-
mately to all of the States, may be invalid under the unexercised Commerce
Clause.
Id. at 7-8.
87. See, e.g., Wardair, 477 U.S. at 7 (stating that "[i]n cases involving the so-called
dormant Commerce Clause, both interstate and foreign, [where] (sic] the Federal Gov-
ernment has not affirmatively acted, and [sic] it is the responsibility of the judiciary to
determine whether actions taken by state or local government unduly threatens the
values the Commerce Clause was intended to serve").
Judicial branch decisions invalidating state measures under the "dormant" Com-
merce Clause are subject to a logical doctrinal caveat: since the Supreme Court is exer-
cising Congressional power, Congress may respond to a Supreme Court decision invali-
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2. Interstate Commerce Clause Review of State Taxation
The Interstate Commerce Clause promotes national eco-
nomic integration among the states and curtails destructive in-
terstate trade practices."' The modern Interstate Commerce
Clause framework was established by the Supreme Court in 1977
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.89 In Complete Auto, a motor
carrier engaged in the interstate transportation of automobiles9 °
challenged a Mississippi tax imposed on taxpayers for the privi-
lege of engaging in the transportation business within the
state.91 The Mississippi tax was measured by a business' gross
receipts from such services.9" In analyzing whether the Missis-
sippi tax violated the Commerce Clause the Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision delivered by Justice Harry Blackmun, estab-
lished that a state or local tax on exclusively interstate business
dating or allowing a state measure by subsequent legislation overturning the judicial
determination. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 80, § 8.1, at 274-75 (stating that "a
necessary corollary to the right of the Court to interpret the sounds of silence... is the
acknowledgment that Congress can respond to the Court's decision with subsequent
legislation 'overturning' the effect of the Court's prior determination"); TRIBE, supra
note 80, § 6.2, at 403-0.4 (stating that "[g]iven their origin as negative judicial infer-
ences from a constitutional grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court's doctrinal
limitations on state interference are always subject to congressional revision").
88. See, e.g., Wardair, 477 U.S. at 7 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325-26 (1979)). In Hughes the Supreme Court underscored the historical importance
of the Commerce Clause in creating an integrated national economy:
The few simple words of the Commerce Clause ... reflected a central
concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitu-
tional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued the relations among the Colonies and later among the states under
the Articles of Confederation.
Id.; see also HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2.1, at 14 (stating that "[t]he purpose of [the
Commerce Clause] is to maintain and advance the idea of a national ... economy, with
the concomitant idea that state legislation, taxing as well as regulatory measures, runs
afoul of the commerce clause, if the legislation creates an undue impediment to the
operation of the economy"); NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 80, § 8.1, at 275 (stating
that "the rational of the Commerce Clause was to create and foster the development of
a common market among the states, eradicating internal trade barriers, and prohibit-
ing the economic Balkanization of the Union."); TRIBE, supra note 80, § 6.3, at 404
(stating that "the Articles of Confederation had failed in large part because the states
had waged destructive trade wars against one another.... Madison's prescription for
economic matters affecting more than one state was to shift legislative authority over
[commerce] to Congress").
89. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
90. Id. at 276.
91. Id. (citing MIss.CoDE ANN., § 10105 (1972 Supp.))
92. Id. (citing MIss.CoDE ANN., § 10109(2) (1972 Supp.))
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was permissible provided it complied with four requirements.
First, the tax applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the
taxing state.93 Second, the tax was fairly apportioned.94 Third,
the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce.95 Fi-
nally, the tax was fairly related to the services provided by the
State.96 Finding that the challenged tax did not violate any of
these four requirements, the Supreme Court dismissed Com-
plete Auto's Commerce Clause challenge.97 The Supreme Court
has held that the Complete Auto test is implicated where a state tax
threatens not only interstate commerce but international com-
merce as well. 98
3. Foreign Commerce Clause Review of State Taxation
At the international level, the Commerce Clause limits state
taxes that threaten U.S. international commercial interests. 9
93. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 279. Under the first two Complete Auto requirements, a state tax affecting
interstate commerce will not be sustained unless there is a: (1) a factual connection
between the taxing state and the taxpayer;s interstate activities, and (2) the measure of
the tax fairly reflects the taxpayer's activities in the state.
Under the third Complete Auto requirement, states may not employ fiscal measures
that impose a greater burden on out-of-state goods, activities, or enterprises than on
competing in-state goods, activities, or enterprises. See, e.g., Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minn., 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959) (stating that "no State, consistent
with the commerce clause, may impose a tax which discriminates against interstate com-
merce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business"). State taxes
may be invalidated under this anti-discrimination principle even if discrimination is
unintentional. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72
(1963) (deciding that even though "inequality in question [was] an accident of statu-
tory drafting" Louisiana use tax violated anti-discrimination principle of interstate com-
merce clause).
The fourth and final requirement of the Complete Auto test has not been subject to
much litigation, but it appears to be satisfied upon the provision of basic in-state serv-
ices. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mont., 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1981) (require-
ment fulfilled when state provide taxpayer with "police and fire protection, the benefits
of a trained workforce, and the advantages of a civilized society").
97. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 289.
98. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
99. Id. at 446-50. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated the view that the scope
of Congress's powers in the international commerce context exceed its interstate com-
merce powers, requiring a more extended judicial review of state measures touching
upon the U.S.'s external commerce. See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932) (stating that "[iun the Constitution, the power to regu-
late commerce is conferred by the same words of the commerce clause with respect
both to foreign commerce and interstate commerce [and] yet the power when exer-
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Review of state tax schemes burdening international commerce
occurs under the Foreign Commerce Clause review of state taxa-
tion schemes established in 1979 in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles.1"' In Japan Line, the Supreme Court analyzed
whether an ad valorem property tax imposed by the County of
Los Angeles on containers, which were used exclusively in the
transport of cargo in foreign commerce, violated the Commerce
Clause." ° The containers were based in, registered, and subject
to a property tax on their full value without apportionment by
Japan.1"2 The Los Angeles tax was assessed by reference to the
value of the containers on the tax lien date and their "average
cised in respect of foreign commerce may be broader than when exercised as to inter-
state commerce"); Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904) (stating that
Congress has "exclusive and absolute power" over foreign commerce); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876) (requiring that regulation of necessity be
national in its character when it affects "a subject which concerns our international
relations, in regard to which foreign nations ought to be considered and their rights
respected"); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (stating that if states pre-
vented federal government from speaking with one voice then "a single state can at her
pleasure embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations"); see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 228 229 (1824) (Johnson,J., concurring) (stating that "the
power to regulate foreign commerce is necessarily exclusive [because tihe states are
unknown to foreign nations; their sovereignty exists only with relation to each other,
and the general government."); Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MmN. L. REv. 432, 465 (1941) (stating that
"in giving Congress the power to regulate commerce, the major concern was with ex-
tranational traffic, with only incidental and minor regard to interstate commerce");
Laura J. Waterland, Note, Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board: The
Supreme Court Encourages Apportionment Taxation, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 689-90
(1985) (arguing that "[hiistory supports the view that states, acting in their capacity as
states, should have little or no influence over foreign affairs"). But cf. Glenn E. Weston,
Comment, State Taxation of International Air Carriers, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 92, 101 (1962)
(stating that "[a]lthough there is some evidence that the constitutional grant of power
to the federal government was intended to be greater with respect to foreign commerce
than with respect to interstate commerce, the juxtaposition of the two provisions in the
Commerce Clause argues for their equation"); Note, State Taxation of International Air
Transportation, 11 STAN. L. Rv. 518, 525 (1959) (noting that "[t]he records of the Con-
stitutional Convention are unclear as to whether the negative implications of Congress's
power over foreign commerce are broader than those inherent in Congress's power
over interstate commerce."); STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, supra note 2, 4.16(2), at 4-
122 (stating that "[a] Ithough there had been a few scattered dicta before Japan Line
suggesting that foreign commerce was entitled to greater constitutional protection
from State action than interstate commerce, no prior decision of the Supreme Court
held so").
100. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
101. Id. at 435-36.
102. Id. at 436-38.
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presence" in Los Angeles County during the tax year.10
3
Speaking for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun indicated
that state fiscal measures touching upon international com-
merce raised two concerns in addition to those addressed by the
Complete Auto Interstate Commerce Clause test.1"4 First, the ma-
jority noted that in the international context, in contradistinc-
tion to the interstate context, no authoritative tribunal existed
that could guarantee that cumulative tax burdens were fairly ap-
portioned between competing tax jurisdictions where one of
those jurisdictions was a sovereign state." 5 Corporations subject
to multiple taxation were, therefore, without any judicial rem-
edy. 10 6 Second, the Supreme Court pointed out that state taxa-
tion schemes could potentially interfere with and damage U.S.
international commercial interests. 107 Where state taxation poli-
cies deviated from parallel federal policies U.S. trading partners
disadvantaged by a state tax might retaliate against U.S. corpora-
tions operating in their jurisdictions.1 0 8 In addition, state tax
103. Id. at 437.
104. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274 (1977); see supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussing Complete Auto
Interstate Commerce Clause test). Initially, the Supreme Court noted that had the con-
tainers been instrumentalities of purely interstate commerce, the Complete Auto test
would apply and be satisfied and the Commerce Clause analysis would be at an end.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445. Because the containers were instrumentalities of foreign
commerce, however "a more extensive constitutional inquiry [was] required." Id. at
446.
105. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447. The Supreme Court stated that:
[N] either this Court nor this nation can ensure full apportionment when
one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. If an instrumentality of com-
merce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may have the right, con-
sistently with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on its full value. If a State
should seek to tax the same instrumentality on an apportioned basis, multiple
taxation inevitably results. Hence, whereas the fact of apportionment in inter-
state commerce means that "multiple burdens logically cannot occur," the
same conclusion as to foreign commerce, logically cannot be drawn. Due to
the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggrega-
tion of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state tax, even
through fairly apportioned to reflect an instrumentality's presence within the
State, may subject foreign commerce to the risk of a double tax burden to
which domestic commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause
forbids.
Id. at 447-48 (quoting Washington Rev. Dept. v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734, 746-47 (1978).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 448.
108. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450. The Supreme Court stated that "[i]f a novel state
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schemes having negative international consequences could also
potentially interfere with the federal government's conduct of
international commercial policy by preventing the federal gov-
ernment from dealing uniformly with other nations. 10 9
The Supreme Court sought to protect these international
concerns by prohibiting state taxes that, first, created an en-
hanced risk of multiple taxation 1 and, second, prevented the
federal government from speaking with "one voice" when regu-
lating commerce with other countries."" Thus, afterJapan Line,
a state tax implicating international commerce had to meet all
four elements of the Complete Auto test as well as the additional
two elements established in Japan Line to satisfy Commerce
Clause requirements.'
The Supreme Court held that the Los Angeles tax violated
both parts of the newly created Foreign Commerce Clause
test. 1 3 First, the tax not only created an enhanced risk of multi-
ple taxation but resulted in multiple taxation in fact." 4 Because
the containers at issue were subject to property taxes to their full
value in Japan, any additional taxation by Los Angeles would re-
sult in multiple taxation." 5 Second, the Court decided that the
Los Angeles tax violated the Japan Line "one voice" standard pro-
hibition because it conflicted with the federal government's es-
tablished tax policy with respect to containers used in interna-
tional trade. 1 6 The United States and Japan as signatory coun-
tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure, foreign nations disadvan-
taged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned instrumentalities present in
their jurisdictions." Id.
109. Id. at 448. The Supreme Court stated that "[f]oreign commerce is pre-emi-
nentiy a matter of national concern. In international relations and with respect to for-
eign intercourse and trade the people act through a single government with unified
and adequate national power." Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S.
48, 59 (1933)).
110. Id. at 446.
111. Id. at 448-49. The Supreme Court stated that "a court must.., inquire, first,
whether the tax ... creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and,
second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from speaking with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. If a state tax
contravenes either of these precepts, it is unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 451.
112. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451; see also HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:17, at 88.
113. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
114. Id. at 451-52.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 452-53.
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tries to the Customs Convention on Containers had agreed not
to impose taxes or duties on containers temporarily present in
their jurisdiction.117 The Los Angeles tax both conflicted with
and frustrated this congressional policy and created an interna-
tional asymmetry to Japan's disadvantage."1 '
C. Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board:
The Constitutionality of Worldwide Unitary Taxation in the
U.S.-Parent MNC Case
The Japan Line decision left open important questions relat-
ing to the scope of Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine. g First,
because the Supreme Court had invalidated the Los Angeles tax
in Japan Line based on the existence of actual multiple taxation,
it remained unclear whether the mere risk of multiple taxation
also constituted sufficient grounds to invalidate state tax meas-
ures.1 20 Second, it also remained unclear whether Foreign Com-
merce Clause review extended beyond property taxation
schemes such as those at issue in Japan Line to include other
fiscal schemes such as state corporate income taxes.
12 1
In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board1 22
the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed for the first time the constitu-
tionality of worldwide unitary taxation under the Commerce
Clause and addressed some of the questions left open in Japan
Line. In Container, a U.S.-parent MNC incorporated in Dela-
ware,12 3 headquartered in Illinois,1 4 and engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing custom ordered paper-board packag-
ing, 125 brought a tax refund suit against the Franchise Tax Board
of California ("FTBC") for the refund of additional franchise tax
117. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452-53 (citing Customs Convention on Containers,
May 18, 1956, art. 2, 20 U.S.T. 301, 304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634, at 4). The Customs Conven-
tion on Containers grants containers "temporary admission free of import duties and
import taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions," provided they are used
solely in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation. Id. (quoting Customs
Convention on Containers, art. 2, 20U.S.T. at 304, T.IAS.. No. 6634, at 4).
118. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452-53.
119. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:17, at 100.
120. Id.
121. Id. § 2:17, at 101.
122. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
123. Container, 463 U.S. at 163.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 171.
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assessments levied against it for the 1963-1965 tax years. 126 The
Commerce Clause questions in Container's challenge arose
from the FTBC's definition of Container's unitary business to
include its Latin American and European subsidiaries under Cal-
ifornia's WWCR-based franchise tax scheme.127 Container con-
tended that this inclusive characterization of its unitary business
resulted in a violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause.12 8 By
combining non-U.S. income in the state apportionable tax base,
California's tax scheme created a heightened risk of multiple
taxation not present when combined apportionment was limited
to the domestic context. 129
When addressing this first Japan Line inquiry,13 0 Justice Wil-
liam Brennan, speaking for the majority, reaffirmed the
Supreme Court's Japan Line position that multiple taxation in
the international context implicated sensitive questions of inter-
national relations and sovereignty. 13  The Supreme Court also
reiterated its concern that taxpayers, who were subjected to in-
ternational multiple taxation, had no recourse to judicial re-
lief.13 2
The Supreme Court, however, decided that judicial review
of state taxes under the Japan Line multiple taxation framework
needed to account for first, the context in which multiple taxa-
tion took place and second, other taxation schemes reasonably
available to a taxing state. 133 Applying this "context" and "op-
126. Id. at 174.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 185.
129. Id. at 189.
130. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussing Japan Line multiple
taxation test).
131. Container, 463 U.S. at 189. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous posi-
tion that "[e]ven a slight overlapping of tax-a problem that might be deemed de minimis
in a domestic context-assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations
and national sovereignty are concerned." Id. (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 (1979)).
132. Id. at 186. Justice Brennan stated:
Due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that
the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more that one full value, a state
tax, even when fairly apportioned to reflect an instrumentality's presence
within the State, may subject foreign commerce to the risk of double tax bur-
den to which [domestic] commerce is not exposed and which the commerce
clause forbids.
133. Id. at 189.
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tions" overlay to the multiple taxation analysis, the Supreme
Court, while conceding that California's franchise tax actually re-
sulted in international multiple taxation, 3 4 held that because
the tax was directed at net income the risk of multiple taxation
could not be entirely eliminated under a separate accounting
method, even if California were to adopt such a scheme."s The
Supreme Court noted, however, that if a state taxation scheme
inevitably led to multiple taxation, then grounds might exist to
invalidate it under the Foreign Commerce Clause.1 3 6
In addressing the second Japan Line requirement,13 7 the
Supreme Court stated that the "one voice" test required an ex-
amination of whether California's taxation scheme, first, impli-
cated external policy issues that must be left to the federal gov-
ernment or, second, violated a clear federal policy.' 38 The Court
failed to' find any especially harmful international implications
of WWCR that might offend U.S. trading partners and lead them
to retaliate.' 9 Rather, the Supreme Court concluded that Cali-
134. Id. at 187.
135. Id. at 191. The U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the general imprecision of
any method for apportioning multijurisdictional income, noted that "[a]illocating in-
come among the various taxing jurisdictions bears some resemblance ... to slicing a
shadow." Id. at 192. The Supreme Court further noted that:
[E]ven though most nations have adopted the arm's-length approach in
its general outlines, the precise rules under which they reallocate income
among affiliated corporations often differ substantially, and whenever that dif-
ference exists, the possibility of double taxation also exists. Thus, even if Cali-
fornia were to adopt some version of the arm's-length approach, it could not
eliminate the risk of double taxation of corporations subject to its franchise
tax, and might in some cases end up subjecting those corporations to more
serious double taxation than would occur under formula apportionment.
Id. at 191. Because multiple taxation was as likely under WWCR as it was under the
separate accounting method, the Court was unwilling to mandate "one allocation
method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation
method that also sometimes results in double taxation." Id. at 193. Justice Brennan
further stated that "[i]n the absence of a central coordinating authority, absolute con-
sistency, even among taxing authorities whose basic approach to the task is quite simi-
lar, may just be too much to ask." Id. at 192.
136. Container, 463 U.S. at 193.
137. Id. at 193-94.
138. Id. at 194.
139. Id. at 194-96. When analyzing whether California's WWCR based franchise
might lead to retaliation by the U.S.'s trading partners, the Supreme Court stated:
In considering this issue... we are faced with a distinct problem. This
Court has little competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will
be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how to
balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the
1500 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1475
fornia's WWCR-based franchise tax merely had non-significant
international resonances, and that as such it survived scrutiny
under the one voice standard. 40 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court noted that the Executive Branch had failed to submit an
amicus brief in opposition to California's franchise tax.141 The
absence of such a submission reinforced the Supreme Court's
view that the external policy of the United States was not seri-
ously threatened by California's use of WWCR. 142 The Court
also failed to find any explicit federal policy prohibiting world-
wide unitary taxation.143 Finally, the Court rejected Container's
argument that Congress was opposed to WWCR and had pre-
empted states from using WWCR-based taxation. The Court
found that the application of WWCR to domestic-parent MNCs
was not fatally inconsistent with any federal policy.' In uphold-
ing California's worldwide unitary taxation scheme, the Supreme
Court subjected its holding to one significant qualification. The
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the application of
worldwide unitary taxation to non-U.S. parent MNCs would sur-
United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please. The best that we
can do, in the absence of explicit action by Congress, is to attempt to develop
objective standards that reflect very general observations about the imperatives
of international trade and international relations.
Id. at 194. The Supreme Court concluded that three factors made it doubtful that
international retaliation would be forthcoming: (1) an "automatic asymmetry" in inter-
national taxation was not the result of California's franchise tax; (2) the incidence of
the tax was ultimately borne by a domestic rather than a non-U.S. corporation; and (3)
while other nations had a legitimate interest in reducing the tax burden of a domestic
corporation, the petitioner-taxpayer was clearly amenable to state taxation, and the
amount of that tax was more a function of California's tax rate rather than its allocation
method. Id. at 194-95.
140. Container, 463 U.S. at 194.
141. Id. at 195.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 197. Thus, the Supreme Court, in reviewing the California tax scheme
under one voice test, employed an explicit federal directive standards as well as a "more
relaxed standard which [took] into account ... [the Court's] residual concerns about
the foreign policy implications of California's tax." Id.
144. Id. at 197. In the Supreme Court's view, the absence of prohibitory congres-
sional intent was clear for three reasons: (1) U.S. bilateral income tax treaties, while
requiring the federal government to use the "arm's length" method to tax the U.S.
income of non-U.S. parent MNCs, generally waive that requirement with respect to U.S.
parent MNCs; (2) the federal tax statutes did not prohibit California from using world-
wide unitary taxation; (3) the U.S. Senate, in considering a proposed tax treaty attached
a reservation declining to give its consent to a provision that would have prohibited the
use of worldwide unitary taxation by the states. Id. at 196.
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vive Foreign Commerce Clause review.1 45
D. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue:
Federal Acquiescence Preemption to State Taxation
Under "dormant" Commerce Clause doctrine federal gov-
ernment silence triggers judicial review of state tax schemes to
determine whether they impermissibly, burden commerce. 46
Not all instances of federal government silence trigger "dor-
mant" Commerce Clause analysis, however. Courts in certain
circumstances have interpreted congressional inaction as inten-
tional, and have read that inaction as acquiescence to a state tax
scheme.1 47 In Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Reve-
nue,148 the Supreme Court analyzed whether federal government
silence on the issue of state taxation of aviation fuel constituted
federal acquiescence to such taxation altogether precluding For-
eign Commerce Clause analysis.1 49
In Wardair, Wardair Canada, a Canadian air carrier engaged
exclusively in international travel, challenged a Florida sales tax
on aviation fuel."' Wardair Canada contended that the federal
145. Container, 463 U.S. at 189 n.26. The Supreme Court stated that "(w]e have no
need to address in this opinion the constitutionality of combined apportionment with
respect to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corpo-
rations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Id. The Supreme Court
similarly noted later in its opinion that "[wie recognize that the fact that the legal inci-
dence of a tax falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic
might be less significant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by for-
eign interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter
our analysis." Id. at 195 n.32.
146. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing operation of "dor-
mant" Commerce Clause).
147. See generally John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative
Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737 (1985); William N. Es-
keridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. Rxv. 67 (1988).
148. 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
149. Id. at 6 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)). Under the preemption doctrine, if Congress
has adopted a federal policy that occupies a field and expressly displaces a state law or,
absent a conflict between state and federal policy, if Congress intends to preempt the
specific field covered by a state law, then the state measure must be invalidated by the
Supreme Court under the Supremacy Clause. Id.; see supra notes 78-80 (discussing
Supremacy Clause).
150. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 3-4. Under a 1983 statute, Florida imposed a flat rate five
percent fuel tax on a deemed price of US$1.148 per gallon on aviation fuel. Id.
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government had long-standing agreements with Canada 151 and
more than seventy other countries 52 under which the signato-
ries had agreed not to subject each other's air carriers to excise
taxes on aviation fuel.153 Florida's actions, in Wardair Canada's
view, violated the Japan Line one voice standard by frustrating
the operation of this federal taxation policy. 54 None of the in-
ternational agreements referred to by Wardair Canada, however,
addressed the issue of state taxation of aviation fuel. 155
Justice William Brennan, speaking for the Supreme Court,
rejected Wardair Canada's argument that federal policy prohib-
ited the imposition of state aviation fuel taxes.' 56 Rather, the
Supreme Court concluded that the federal government's failure
to address the issue of subnational taxes on aviation fuel in its
international aviation agreements constituted an affirmation of
the states' power to impose the tax.157 Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that the federal government, by remaining silent on
the issue of state taxation of aviation fuel, had in practice affirm-
atively acquiesced to such taxation, making unnecessary a For-
eign Commerce Clause analysis.' The Supreme Court noted
151. Id. (citing United States-Canada Nonscheduled Air Services Agreement, May
8, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 787, T.I.A.S. No. 7826).
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id. at 9-10.
154. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 9. Wardair Canada recognized that there was no threat
of multiple taxation in its case since the fuel tax was imposed only upon the sale of fuel,
a discrete transaction that occurred only within one jurisdiction. Id.
155. Id. at 11.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Id. at 12. The U.S. Supreme Court examined the international aviation
agreements specified by Wardair Canada and noted that they contained notable omis-
sions on the state aviation tax issue, and thus supported an inference of affirmative
congressional acquiescence to such taxation: for example (1) the Federal Aviation Act,
while regulating aviation extensively, nevertheless expressly permitted states to impose
the type of taxation in question, id. at 7 (noting that § 1513(b) of Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. app. § 1513 (addressing issue of "State Taxation of Air Commerce" expressly
permits "state or use taxes on the sale of goods and services"); (2) the US-Canada inter-
national aviation agreement did not deny the states the power to tax purchases of avia-
tion fuel, id. at 6-7; and (3) the federal government had enacted more than 70 interna-
tional aviation agreements, none of which contained provisions limiting taxation of avi-
ation fuel by state and local governments, id. at 11.
158. Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12. The Supreme Court stated:
What all of this makes abundantly clear is that the Federal Government
has not remained silent with regard to the question whether States should
have the power to impose taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign carriers in
international travel. By negative implication... the United States has at least
acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international
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that while the federal government held an aspiration to elimi-
nate impediments to international air travel, the law as it stood
did not prohibit the taxation of aviation fuel by the states.159
II. BARCLAYS BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
OF CALIFORNIA
In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California,60
the Supreme Court analyzed the reserved issue it had declined
to answer eleven years earlier in Container regarding worldwide
unitary taxation.161 The issue before the Supreme Court in Bar-
clays was whether California's use of WWCR-based taxation to
calculate state franchise tax liabilities of non-U.S. parent MNCs
with in-state subsidiaries violated the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Clauses. 62 The Supreme Court concluded, first, that
California's use of worldwide unitary taxation did not unconsti-
tutionally discriminate against non-U.S. parent MNCs and thus
did not violate the Interstate Commerce Clause. 163  The
Supreme Court concluded, second, that the California's use of
WWCR-based taxation did not violate Foreign Commerce Clause
prohibitions against multiple taxation or interfere with the fed-
eral government's conduct of international commerce.
1 64
A. The Factual Background in Barclays
In Barclays, Barclays Bank PLC ("Barclays") brought a tax
refund suit in California state court165 to recover additional
travel .... It would turn dormant Commerce Clause analysis entirely upside
down ... to apply it in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal
Government has elected to follow. For the dormant Commerce Clause, in
both its interstate and foreign incarnations, only operates where the Federal
Government has not spoken to ensure that the essential attributes of na-
tionhood will not be jeopardized by States acting as independent economic
actors.
Id.
159. Id. at 10.
160. - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) [hereinafter Barclays IV].
161. Id. at 2271; see supra notes 132-47 (discussing Container reservation by
Supreme Court as to constitutionality of applying worldwide unitary taxation to non-
U.S. parent MNCs).
162. Id. at 2272.
163. Id. at 2276-77.
164. Id. at 2281, 2285.
165. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2274. The tax refund suits were initially brought in
California state court by Barclays Bank of California ("Barcal") and Barclays Bank Inter-
national ("BBI"). Id. at 2274. In 1977, Barcal was a California banking corporation
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franchise tax 166 assessments levied against it by the Franchise
Tax Board of California ("FTBC") for the 1977 tax year. 1 6 7 The
refund suit arose from the FTBC's rejection of Barclays' charac-
terization of unitary business to include only its California opera-
tions.1 68 The FTBC, after determining that under the California
WWCR-based franchise tax statute'69 Barclays' California subsidi-
aries, together with its U.K-based parent, Barclays Bank Lim-
ited,1 7° and related worldwide affiliates, was part of a single uni-
tary business, the Barclays Group,17' applied California's three
wholly owned by Barclays Bank International. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 639 (Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 202 (1992) [hereinafter Barclays 1]. The California Supreme Court re-
manded the Barclays matter to the California Court of Appeal for further consideration.
Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Ct. App. 1992),
aff'd, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2278 (1994). BBI in 1977 was
a U.K corporation doing business directly or through subsidiaries in approximately 55
countries. Barclays 1, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 639. BBI had an interest for California unitary
group purposes in more than 70 subsidiaries operating in approximately 34 countries
outside the United Kingdom. Id. The petitioner-taxpayer in the U.S. Supreme Court
litigation was Barclays Bank PLC ["Barclays"], the U.K-based successor-in-interest to the
tax refund claims of Barcal and BBI, the plaintiffs in the California state court litigation.
Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2275 n.7. This Comment refers to the plaintiff-taxpayers
throughout its discussion of the Barclays cases, both in state and federal court, as "Bar-
clays."
166. See supra note 26 (describing franchise tax).
167. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
168. Id. at 2274. In computing its California franchise taxes for the 1977 income
year, Barcal reported only the income from its own operations in California. Id. BBI
reported income based on the assumption that it was part of a unitary business com-
posed of itself and its subsidiaries, but not its parent corporation and the other subsidi-
aries of its parent corporation. Id.
169. Barclays I, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (citing CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE, § 25101 (West
1977)). In 1977 California's worldwide unitary taxation statute provided in pertinent
part:
When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax imposed under this part
is derived from or attributable to sources both within and without the state the
tax shall be measured by the net income derived from or attributable to
sources within this state in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.
Id.
170. Barclays I, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40. In 1977, Barclays Bank Limited, the U.K
ultimate corporate parent, owned sufficient interests in over 140 subsidiaries that oper-
ated outside the United States for California unitary business purposes. Id. Only three
of its subsidiaries, Barcal, BBI, and Barclays Bank of New York did business in the
United States. Id.
171. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2274. Altogether the Barclays Group comprised
more than 220 separate entities engaged in business activities in approximately 60
countries. Barclays , 275 Cal. Rptr. at 640. In 1977 approximately 1.5% of the income
of the Barclays Group worldwide was generated in California. Id. Thus, over 98% of
the Barclays Group's income in 1977 had its source outside the United States. Id.
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factor apportionment formula to establish Barclays' in-state in-
come tax base. 172 Based on these calculations the FTBC assessed
additional taxes amounting to US$154,098.17' Barclays' primary
claim was that the application of California's franchise tax to
non-U.S. parent MNCs violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause.' 74 Additionally, Barclays claimed that WWCR imposed
inordinate compliance costs on specifically non-U.S. parent
MNCs, and thereby violated the anti-discrimination prohibition
of the Interstate Commerce Clause.' 75 Barclays prevailed on
both its Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause arguments in
California Superior Court, thus invalidating California's use of
worldwide unitary taxation for determining franchise tax liabili-
ties of non-U.S. parent MNCs.' 7
6
B. The California Court of Appeal Decision
In reviewing the California Superior Court's decision, the
California Court of Appeal for the Third District ("Court of Ap-
peal") addressed the FTBC's threshold argument that dormant
Commerce Clause analysis was preempted by the existence of a
federal policy allowing WWCR based taxation. 77 The FTBC
pointed to several examples of federal conduct on the WWCR
issue that demonstrated an affirmative federal policy to allow
WWCR-based taxation.'17  The Court of Appeal rejected this ar-
172. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2273.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2279. Barclays conceded from the outset of the litigation that together
with its U.K. parent and affiliates it constituted a unitary business. Id. at 2274-75.
175. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2277.
176. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., Nos. 325059 & 325061 (Super.
Ct., Sacramento Cty, 1990), aff'd, Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal.
Rptr. 626 (CL App. 1990), rev'd, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 202
(1992). The California Supreme Court remanded the Barclays matter to the California
Court of Appeal for further consideration. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2278 (1994).
177. Barclays I, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
178. Id. The FrBC pointed to five factors that supported its argument that Con-
gress had affirmatively acquiesced to the states' use of WWCR: (1) the failure of U.S.
bilateral income tax treaties to consider state taxes except in nondiscrimination clauses;
(2) the absence of specific requirements in U.S. Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion Treaties ("FCN" Treaties) that the states use a particular method of tax accounting;
(3) actions by the Executive Branch, including the adoption of a Model Income Tax
Treaty and the reservation of its position in the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development's Model Convention with respect to subnational taxes; (4) the ab-
sence of Congressional legislation prohibiting or restricting the use of WWCR to non-
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gument on the grounds that the specified federal actions
demonstrated only a general policy by the federal government of
non-interference in state taxation and a desire to preserve the
principle of state sovereignty. 179
Having overcome the preemption hurdle, the Court of Ap-
peal next addressed whether the application of WWCR to non-
U.S. parent MNCs; and (5) the U.S. Senate's removal of Article 9(4) in the Convention
Between United States and United Kingdom for Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec.
31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5670, 5677, T.I.A.S. No. 9682 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty],
which would have prohibited the states' application of WWCR to U.K-based corporate
groups. Id.
179. Id. The California Court of Appeal ["Court of Appeal"] reasoned that the
first three factors pointed to by the IFTBC did not sufficiently translate into an affirma-
tion of a particular type of taxation for three reasons: (1) since most U.S. bilateral
income tax treaties antedated the WWCR methodology, Congress could not have been
aware of the WWCR methodology when it ratified those treaties and, therefore, could
not by "negative implication" have acquiesced to its use; (2) non-discrimination clauses
in U.S bilateral income tax treaties, like those in FCN treaties, simply reflected a gen-
eral principle that a state cannot tax a non-U.S. business more than it taxes domestic
businesses and did not sufficiently translate into an affirmation of a particular type of
taxation; and (3), none of the U.S. bilateral income tax treaties, with the exception of
the US-UK Tax Treaty specifically dealt with the issue of unitary taxation or the use of
WWCR by subnational units. Id. at 634-36. The Court of Appeal concluded that:
The [FTBC's] approach is simply too general and ignores the historical
context in essentially arguing that when a treaty is limited to national taxes or
fails to discuss a particular taxation method, a conscious decision has been
made to allow states to tax in any manner they please. Common sense charts a
different course while respecting the broad power of a state to tax.
Id. The Court of Appeal rejected the FrBC's more concrete argument that the U.S.
Senate's removal of Article 9(4) in the U.S.-U.KL Tax Treaty constituted an affirmative
federal policy to allow WWCR because such a conclusion would be "reading too much
into too little." Id. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty with
the prohibitory provision included had the support of the Senate majority since it failed
to receive the requisite two-third majority by only five votes. Id. at 636-37.
The Court of Appeal also compared the treaty analysis in Wardair with the argu-
ments put forward by the FrBC. Id. at 635; see supra notes 158-61 (discussing Supreme
Court's treaty analysis in Wardair). In contrast to its general treatment of WWCR by the
federal government, the Court of Appeals highlighted the specific and concrete treat-
ment of aviation fuel taxation by the federal government. Id. The Court of Appeal
pointed out that the state aviation fuel taxes at issue in Wardair had been discussed in
the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, and a Nov. 14, 1966 Resolution of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, well before the more than 70 international aviation agreements which
the United States had entered into were negotiated. Id. Therefore "[t]he American
government and the international community were.., negotiating these agreements
with a keen awareness of the tax involved in Wardair." Id. The Court of Appeal con-
cluded its pre-emption analysis by noting that "in trying to assign a specific reason to
legislative inaction, we must enter the realm of pure speculation" and "find[ing] mean-
ing in legislative silence [was] about as difficult as hearing sound in a vacuum." Id. at
636.
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U.S. parent MNCs violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.18 0 In
analyzing, first, whether application of worldwide unitary taxa-
tion to non-U.S. parent MNCs created an enhanced risk of multi-
ple taxation, the Court of Appeal followed the precedent set in
Container."'1 The Court of Appeal decided that because multiple
taxation in the non-U.S. parent context was not the inevitable
outcome of WWCR 8 2 and resorting to the separate accounting
method would not entirely eliminate double taxation, Califor-
nia's tax did not violate the first Japan Line requirement.18 3
The Court of Appeal concluded, however, that the applica-
tion of WWCR to non U.S.-parent MNCs posed a significant
threat to U.S. international commercial interests and violated
the one voice test.'8 4 Examining the international ramifications
of WWCR, the Court of Appeal found that worldwide unitary tax-
ation had offended U.S. trading partners and had created a dan-
ger of retaliation against U.S. businesses overseas. 185 The Court
180. Barclays , 275 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
181. Id. at 637.
182. Id. The Court of Appeal stated that there was no "constitutionally significant
differences between domestic-based and foreign-based multinational corporations con-
cerning the enhanced risk of multiple taxation: in neither case is double taxation inevi-
table." Id.; see supra notes 120-47 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
Container decision).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Barclays , 275 Cal. Rptr. at 637-38. The Court of Appeal pointed to the signif-
icant number of protests the United States had received from its trading partners re-
garding the states' use of worldwide unitary taxation. Id. at 638. In addition, the Court
of Appeal noted that in 1985 the United Kingdom had initiated retaliatory legislation
designed to withdraw tax advantaged for any U.S. businesses operating in the U.K. and
based in a WWCR state. Id. The Court of Appeal also concluded that retaliation
against the United States was likely under the three factors identified in Container for
analyzing the likelihood of international countermeasures. Id.; see supra note 141 (dis-
cussing three factors specified in Container for determining likelihood of international
retaliation against state fiscal measure). First, the application of WWCR to non-U.S.
parent MNCs created an automatic asymmetry in international taxation operating to
the non-U.S. parent MNC's disadvantage. Barclays 1, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 638. An interna-
tional asymmetry existed for two reasons: (1) because no other country in the world
used WWCR, domestic-parent MNCs did not face the taxation method abroad; and (2)
the compliance burden imposed on non-U.S. parent MNCs doing business in states
using WWCR disproportionately affected non-U.S. businesses. Id. Second, the Court of
Appeal determined that the legal incidence of California's WWCR-based franchise tax
was borne by a non-U.S. rather than a domestic parent MNC. Id. at 638-39. Finally, the
Court of Appeal found that it was the application of unitary taxation, not the unitary tax
rate itself, that imposed the compliance burden on non-U.S. corporate groups. Id. at
639. The Court of Appeal noted that non-U.S. parent MNCs incurred a significantly
greater burden than domestic corporations in complying with California's WWCR
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of Appeal also found that California's application of WWCR to
non U.S.-parent MNCs violated a federal directive barring the
states from using WWCR as pronounced by the executive
branch.186 While noting that no explicit congressional policy ex-
isted on this issue, in the Court of Appeal's view, consistent Exec-
utive Branch opposition to the application of worldwide unitary
taxation to non-U.S.-parent MNCs provided the necessary fed-
eral directive.1 87
scheme because non-U.S. multinationals often did not keep their records in English,
U.S. currency, or in accord with U.S. accounting principles. Id. In addition, non-U.S.
parent MNCs often incurred substantial costs in obtaining the necessary financial infor-
mation and translating it into WWCR-compatible format. Id. Citing testimony from the
trial record, the Court of Appeal noted that it would cost Barclays between US$6.4-7.7
million to establish an accounting system that satisfied California's WWCR require-
ments, and between US$2-3.8 million a year to maintain the system. Id. The Court of
Appeal finally concluded that:
In contrast to Container then, we do not have to speculate on whether the
taxation method at issue may offend our foreign trading partners and lead
them to retaliate against the nation as a whole. They are offended; they have
retaliated. And the three general factors identified in Container that might
justifiably lead to significant retaliation ... are all present in this case.
Id. at 640-41.
186. Barclays , 275 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42. The Court of Appeal relied on Justice
Jackson's tripartite framework established in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952), to overcome the constitutional problem inherent in establishing
the existence of a federal policy by reference to Executive Branch pronouncements. Id.
at 642-43. While noting that the U.S. Constitution explicitly granted Congress the for-
eign commerce power, under the Youngstoum framework, "[w]hen the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority." Id. at 643 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-38). The
Court of Appeal further noted that "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes... enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential respon-
sibility," and "[iun this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the impera-
tives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law." Id. The Court of Appeal determined that the Executive Branch's actions on the
WWCR controversy aligned themselves with this second category of Justice Jackson's
framework. Id. Given the historic recognition in American constitutional jurispru-
dence that the executive branch possessed extensive power in the foreign relations
field, combined with the need for "swift and effectual national power" in this era of
changing economic conditions, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Executive
Branch's position on WWCR was entitled to the full weight of a federal policy. Id. at
643-44.
187. Id. at 642. The Court of Appeal pointed to a number of actions by the Execu-
tive Branch supporting its conclusion that the federal government opposed the states'
use of WWCR in the international context: (1) the Treasury Department, the executive
organ that formulated federal tax policy, had undertaken several studies in which it had
concluded that WWCR should not be applied to non-U.S. parent corporate groups; (2)
Executive Branch opposition to the application of WWCR had remained constant
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C. The California Supreme Court Decision
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, Justice Ara-
bian, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Court of Appeal and
resurrected California's worldwide unitary taxation scheme. 188
After reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's principal Foreign
Commerce Clause cases, 189 the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that during the 1980's the scope of this doctrine had
been significantly narrowed by the Court. 9 ° This more re-
stricted application of the Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine,
the California Supreme Court opined, was primarily the result of
the U.S. Supreme Court's Wardair decision191 and reflected the
Court's heightened sensitivity to congressional pronouncements
on external policy issues.1 92
Following the Wardair precedent, the California Supreme
through four presidential administrations; and (3) President Ronald Reagan had pub-
licly instructed the Attorney General to pursue through litigation and the Treasury
through legislation and, where appropriate, treaty amendment, the federal policy that
non-U.S. parent MNCs should not be subjected to WWCR. Id. at 641-42.
188. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 280 (1992) [here-
inafter Barclays I]. The California Supreme Court remanded the Barclays matter to the
California Court of Appeal for further consideration. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
189. Barclays II, 829 P.2d at 286-93 (reviewing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159
(1983); Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1 (1986)).
190. Id. at 290. The California Supreme Court stated that:
The fact is.. . that dormant foreign commerce clause ... jurisprudence
has evolved in the nine years since Container was decided, an evolution that, as
we parse the cases, has reoriented the doctrine. That development has re-
duced the scope for a dormant analysis and makes its invocation here particu-
larly inappropriate.
Id.
191. Id. at 293. The California Supreme Court stated that:
We are confident that the overarching significance of Wardair lies in its
explicit limitation on when a dormant foreign commerce clause analysis is ap-
propriate, its affirmation that the analysis "only operates where the Federal
Government has not spoken," and its statement that the court has "never sug-
gested that the Foreign Commerce Clause insists that the Federal Government
speak with any particular voice."
Id. (quoting Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1986)); see
supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's Wardair deci-
sion).
192. Barclays II, 829 P.2d at 290-293. The California Supreme Court decided that
the scope of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine was curtailed in Wardair be-
cause the interpretive framework established in that case for adducing from congres-
sional pronouncements the existence of the kind of governmental silences foreclosing
1510 FORDHAM1NVTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1475
Court examined congressional actions on the worldwide unitary
taxation issue. First, the California Supreme Court noted that
the U.S. Senate in 1978 had rejected the U.K-U.S. Tax Treaty,
whose centerpiece, Article 9(4), prohibited the states from using
worldwide unitary taxation to calculate the income tax liabilities
of U.K. MNCs. t9 Only after Article 9(4) was removed by amend-
ment, the California Supreme Court emphasized, was the requi-
site two-thirds majority necessary to ratify the U.S.-U.K. Tax
Treaty obtainable.194 Second, the California Supreme Court
pointed out that over twenty U.S. House and Senate bills had
been introduced into Congress during a twenty-year period to
curtail the states' use of worldwide unitary taxation, none of
which had been enacted into law. 195  Finally, the California
Supreme Court highlighted that while U.S. bilateral income tax
treaties generally required the federal government to use the
separate accounting method in its tax treatment of domestic
dormant analysis reflected a "heightened judicial attentiveness to expressions of con-
gressional foreign policy." Id.
193. Id. at 295 (quoting Convention Between United States and United Kingdom
for Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T. 5670, 5677, T.IAS. No.
9682, at 10). Prior to its amendment, Article 9(4) of the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty stated
that:
Except as specifically provided in this Article, in determining the tax lia-
bility of an enterprise doing business in a Contracting State, or in a political
subdivision or local authority of a Contracting State, such Contracting State,
political subdivision or local authority shall not take into account the income,
deductions, receipts, or outgoings of a related enterprise of the other Con-
tracting State or of an enterprise of any third State related to an enterprise of
the other Contracting State.
Id. (quoting art. 9(4), 31 U.S.T. at 5677, T.I.A.S. No. 9682, at 10).
194. Id. at 295 (quoting 124 CONG. REc. 18,416 (1978)). The congressional debate
stated that "the provisions of paragraph (4) of Article 9 . . . shall not apply to any
political subdivision or local authority of the United States." Id. The California
Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal's argument that an affirmative congres-
sional intent to preserve worldwide unitary taxation could not be inferred from the U.S.
Senate's rejection of the U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty without the reservation, because it failed
by only five votes to garner the necessary two-thirds majority. Id. at 296; see supra note
181 (discussing Court of Appeal reasoning as to U.S.-U.K. Tax Treaty). In the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's view:
Preliminary voting tallies lack meaning precisely because they are not de-
finitive, may be cast for any number of tactical parliamentary reasons, and thus
do not reliably reflect legislative policy. The sole constitutional mechanism
for congressional consideration of executive-negotiated treaties is Senate rati-
fication by a two-thirds majority ... ; to that defining vote, institutional signifi-
cance sensibly can and should be ascribed.
Barclays II, 829 P.2d at 296.
195. Id.
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branches of non-U.S. businesses, the same requirement did not
apply to taxation methods used by political subdivisions. 196
Many of these same tax treaties also contained non-discrimina-
tion provisions that were explicitly binding on subnational or-
gans. 197 By negative implication the California Supreme Court
surmised that a limited ban of some aspects of taxation com-
bined with inclusion as to other aspects of tax treatment demon-
strated that Congress had adopted a policy of curtailing only
some aspects of state fiscal power while implicitly preserving
others.198 In light of this congressional conduct the California
Supreme Court concluded that Congress by negative implication
had affirmatively allowed the states to use WWCR-based taxation,
fully precluding a Commerce Clause analysis. 199
196. Id. at 298.
197. Id.
198. Barclays II, 829 P.2d at 295-98. The California Supreme Court rejected the
Court of Appeal's conclusion that U.S. bilateral income tax treaties did not demon-
strate congressional acquiescence to the state's use of WWCR. Id. at 297. In the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's view, the Court of Appeal had erroneously concluded that such
income tax treaties could not, by negative implication, demonstrate congressional affir-
mation of WWCR because when they were adopted, diplomatic and international cir-
cles were not aware of the WWCR methodology. Id. According to the California
Supreme Court, international financial and diplomatic circles were fully cognizant of
WWCR from at least the mid-1950's, well before the multinational corporate boom and
the surge in unitary tax litigation of the 1970's. Id. This conclusion was evident from
the number of unitary taxation cases adjudicated in the 1950's, a 1956 federal tax stat-
ute authorizing the use of unitary taxation in the international context, and explicit
references in U.S. bilateral income tax treaties entered into in the 1940's. Id.
199. Id. at 294. The California Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating
that:
It is clear that federal limitations on the states' use of worldwide formula
apportionment is a controversial political and economic issue of which Con-
gress has long been aware. In light of the history, we cannot turn away from
the substantial evidence of Congress's repeated refusal to intervene in the reg-
ulation of state division of income methods for tax purposes, even one that
provokes continuing international complaint. Under the compulsions of es-
tablished constitutional doctrine, the courts sometimes are required to divine
what foreign commerce policy Congress would pursue in the absence of any
indication that it has thought about the subject; it is a quite different matter,
however, for a court to ignore a pattern of congressional action that evidences
both an awareness of an issue and a refusal to adopt the remedy urged upon it
by executive officials and resisted by its state constituencies. The latter, we
believe, viewed in context alongside additional treaty materials, is a govern-
mental silence that is eloquent.
In light of Congress's awareness of antagonistic state taxation and interna-
tional business interests, the path taken by the high court in [Wardair] seems
the constitutionally correct one here. To invest a paper trail of executive aspi-
ration with the dignity of a clear federal directive would... "turn dormant
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The California Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeal for further proceedings on Barclays' additional
constitutional challenges predicated on the Interstate Com-
merce Clause.200 On remand the California Court of Appeal
found that the application of WWCR-based taxes to non-U.S.
parent MNCs did not violate the Interstate Commerce Clause.2 0 1
The Court of Appeal thus upheld California's use of worldwide
unitary taxation in the non-U.S. parent context.202
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
On June 20, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its de-
cision in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California.03
The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two decision written by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, held that the application of WWCR to
non-U.S. parent MNCs did not violate either the Interstate or
the Foreign Commerce Clauses. 0 4 California's use of WWCR to
calculate franchise tax liabilities for non-U.S. parent corpora-
tions was therefore found to be constitutional. 20 5 Justices Harry
Blackmun and Antonin Scalia filed concurring opinions.2 16 Jus-
Commerce Clause analysis upside down." Taking our lead from the high
court, we decline to adjudicate on dormant foreign commerce clause grounds
a debate between the political branches of the federal government over what
is... a sharply contested issue of national tax policy that has been repeatedly
aired before Congress. We adhere to the central meaning of the high court's
opinion in Wardair in holding that Congress's refusal to legislate restrictions
on state use of worldwide formula apportionment is not the sort of govern-
mental silence that triggers a dormant foreign commerce clause analysis.
Id. at 300 (quoting Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 12
(1986)).
200. Id. at 300.
201. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 539 (Ct.
App. 1992) [hereinafter Barclays II].
202. Id.
203. - U.S. -., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). The case went before the U.S. Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari to the California Court of Appeal, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 379
(1993). A companion case, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., - U.S. -, 114 S.
Ct. 2268 (1994), which also involved constitutional challenges against California's use
of WWCR by a U.S.-parent MNC, was consolidated and heard jointly with the Barclays IV
petition. Id. at 2275. This Comment does not discuss the Colgate litigation in the U.S.
Supreme Court.
204. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing reservation by Supreme
Court as to constitutionality of WWCR when applied to non-U.S. parent MNCs in
Container).
205. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2272, 2285.
206. Id. at 2286-87.
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tice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas,
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.20 7
1. The Majority Opinion
Barclays first claimed that the application of worldwide uni-
tary taxation to non-U.S. parent MNCs violated the non-discrimi-
nation principle of the Interstate Commerce Clause. 0 8 Barclays
argued that in complying with California's WWCR-based
franchise tax scheme, non-U.S. parent MNCs were subjected to a
prohibitive burden2 09 converting non-U.S. financial and ac-
counting records for their international operations into U.S. lan-
guage, currency, and accounting principles.2 a° U.S. taxpayers,
who already maintained their records in WWCR-compatible for-
mat, did not bear an analogous hardship.211 This unequal com-
pliance burden operated in substance as economic protection
for U.S.-owned corporations in contravention of the anti-dis-
crimination principle of the Interstate Commerce Clause. 12
While reaffirming the principle that state-imposed compli-
ance burdens falling disproportionately on out-of-state and non-
U.S. entities violated the Interstate Commerce Clause, 3 the ma-
jority found that the factual predicates of the Barclays' claim did
not establish a constitutional violation.2 14 The Supreme Court
reasoned that while California's franchise tax reporting require-
ments could potentially discriminate against non-U.S parent cor-
porations,2 15 actual compliance costs were mitigated by Califor-
207. Id. at 2287-90.
208. Id. at 2277; see supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text (discussing Interstate
Commerce Clause).
209. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2277 (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC at 43, Bar-
clays IV (No. 92-1384)).
210. Id. (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC at 44, Barclays IV (No. 92-1384).
211. Id. (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC at 45, Barclays IV (No. 92-1384)). The
trial court made a finding of fact that an accounting system that would meet the re-
quirements of California's WWCR system would cost more than of US$5 million to
establish and over US$2 million a year to maintain. Id. at n. 11 (citing Brief for Barclays
Bank PLC at 44 n.13, Barclays IV (No. 92-1384)).
212. Id. (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC at 43-46, Barclays IV (No. 92-1384)).
213. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2277 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver-
tising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977)).
214. Id.
215. Id. Under California regulations implementing state tax reporting require-
ments, a taxpayer had three methods for satisfying its reporting obligations. Id. at 2277-
78 (quoting CAL.CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 25137-6(b)(1)-(2)). A "unitary business with op-
erations in foreign countries," could determine its worldwide income based on (1) "[a]
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nia's provision for the use of "reasonable approximations" where
the required data could not be developed from standard finan-
cial records. 16 Because Barclays had computed its worldwide in-
come based on such "reasonable approximations," the large
compliance costs of which it complained were avoided. 1 7 As
Barclays had not in fact suffered an inordinate burden in com-
plying with California's WWCR system,218 the Supreme Court
held that no unconstitutional discrimination had occurred.219
The Supreme Court next proceeded to Barclays' Foreign
Commerce Clause arguments. °2  The Foreign Commerce
profit and loss statement ... for each foreign branch or corporation;" (2) the "consoli-
dated profit and loss statement prepared for the related corporations of the which the
unitary business is a member which is prepared for filing with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission;" or (3) "the consolidated profit and loss statement of the pre-
pared for reporting to shareholders and subject to review by an independent auditor."
Id. at 2278 n.12.
216. Id. at 2278. California regulations implementing the state's WWCR scheme
provided that the Franchise Tax Board "shall consider the effort and expenses required
to obtain the necessary information," and in "appropriate cases, such as when the nec-
essary data cannot be developed from the financial records maintained in the regular
course of business," may accept "reasonable approximations." Id. (citing CAL.CODE
REGs. tit. 18, § 25137-6(e)(1)).
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Barclays III, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548 n.9). The Court of Appeal
found that Barclays' actual compliance costs were on average between US$900 and
US$1250 per annum for the years immediately preceding the 1977 tax-year. Id. at 2278
n.13 (citing Barclays III, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548 n.9).
219. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2278. Barclays additionally argued that even if the
allowance of "reasonable approximations" mitigated the discriminatory operation of
California's reporting requirements, the "reasonable approximations" method was un-
constitutional. Id. Specifically, since no substantive criteria were specified for deter-
mining which approximations would be accepted by the FTBC, the grant of standar-
dless discretion violated Due Process. Id. (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC, at 49,
Barclays IV (No. 92-1384)). The majority rejected this argument on the grounds that
California tax officials did not in fact exercise arbitrary authority: because (1) California
courts had construed the California law to limit the discretion of the FTBC by requiring
the FTBC to "consider regularly-maintained or other readily-accessibl[e] corporate doc-
uments in deciding whether the cost and effort of producing (worldwide combined
reporting] information justifie[d] submission of reasonable approximations," id. (quot-
ing Barclays III, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549; (2) Barclays had the opportunity to resort to
administrative procedures by which "to clarify the meaning of the regulation [s] by its
own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process," id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 445 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)); and (3) taxpayers could seek
under the California regulations a determination in advance as to the tax consequences
of a proposed course of action, id. at 2279 (citing CAL.CODE OF REGS., tit. 18,
§ 25137(e)(2) (1985)).
220. Id. at 2279; see supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text (discussing Foreign
Commerce Clause).
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Clause required the Supreme Court to determine, first, whether
the application of California's franchise tax to non-U.S. parent
MNCs created an enhanced risk of multiple taxation.2 2 1 Barclays
sought to distinguish its case as a non-U.S. parent MNC from
that of U.S. parent MNCs with respect to the multiple taxation
issue. 22 Barclays argued that non-U.S parent MNCs typically
had a larger percentage of their operations and affiliates outside
the United States when compared to U.S.-parent MNCs,2 3 and
consequently, a larger proportion of a non-U.S. parent MNC's
income was subject to taxation in other countries.2 4 Thus, in
Barclays' view, by forcing non-U.S. parent MNCs to include their
worldwide income under its franchise tax reporting require-
ments, California's tax exposed non-U.S. parent MNC's to a
more aggravated risk of multiple taxation than U.S. parent
MNCs. 225 Barclays additionally argued that because California
wage rates, property values, and sales prices were on average
higher than corresponding values in other countries where it
conducted business, California's apportionment formula oper-
ated to allocate a higher proportion of income to the state,
which resulted in multiple taxation. 26
In analyzing the multiple taxation issue, the Supreme Court
affirmed the analytical framework for analyzing multiple taxa-
tion issues it had developed earlier in Container.2 2 7 The Court
rejected Barclays' arguments that the application of worldwide
unitary taxation to non-U.S. parent MNCs led to unconstitu-
tional multiple taxation on the grounds WWCR did not inevita-
bly result in multiple taxation, 228 and because no alternatives
reasonably available to California existed that dispositively less-
ened the risk of multiple taxation. 9
221. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2279.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2279.
224. Id. (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC, at 33, Barclays IV (No. 92-1384)).
225. Id. (citing Brief for Barclays Bank PLC, at 32-33, Barclays IV (No. 92-1384)).
226. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2279.
227. Id. at 2280 n.18. The Court recognized that its decision in Container, "effec-
tively modified, for purposes of income taxation, the Commerce Clause multiple taxa-
tion inquiry described in Japan Line." Id.; see supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text
(discussing Container decision and its analysis of the double taxation issue).
228. Barclay IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2280.
229. Id. The majority opinion stated:
[Container's] holding on multiple taxation relied on two considerations:
first, that multiple taxation was not the inevitable result of the California
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The Supreme Court next addressed the federal preemption
issue and the "one voice" inquiry.2 0 The majority, unable to dis-
cern any specific indications of congressional intent barring
WWCR, 31 concluded that Congress had not preempted Califor-
nia's worldwide unitary taxation scheme.23 2 First, the Court
noted that in the eleven years since its Container decision, Con-
gress could have, but did not, enact legislation barring the states'
use of WWCR.233 Second, Congress, aware that other nations
were displeased with worldwide unitary taxation, had on several
occasions studied the WWCR problem, but had repeatedly failed
to enact legislation prohibiting its use.2 4 Finally, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the U.S. Senate's failure to pass the U.S.-
U.K. Tax Convention with a prohibition on the states' use of
WWCR indicated that Congress condoned its use. 35
In reviewing whether California's franchise tax prevented
the federal government from speaking with "one voice," the
Supreme Court opined that Congress could more passively indi-
[worldwide unitary] tax; and second, that the alternative reasonably available
to the taxing State (i.e. some version of the separate accounting/arm's length
approach), could not eliminate the risk of double taxation and might in some
cases enhance that risk. We underscored that even though most nations have
adopted the arm's-length approach in its general outlines, the precise rules
under which they reallocate income among affiliated corporations often differ
substantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of double tax-
ation also exists.
These considerations are not dispositively diminished when California's
tax is applied to the components of foreign, as opposed to domestic, multina-
tionals. Multiple taxation of such entities because of California's scheme is
not inevitable; the existence vel non of actual multiple taxation of income
remains, as in [Container], dependent on the facts of the individual case. And
if, as we have held, adoption of a separate accounting system does not disposi-
tively lessen the risk of multiple taxation of the income earned by foreign affil-
iates of domestic-owned corporations, we see no reason why it would do so in
respect of the income earned by foreign affiliates of foreign-owned corpora-
tions. We refused in [Container) "to require California to give up one alloca-
tion method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another
allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation." The for-
eign domicile of the taxpayer (or taxpayer's the parent) is a factor inadequate
to warrant retraction of that position.
Id. at 2280-81 (quoting Container, 463 U.S. at 159).
230. Id. at 2281-86.
231. Id. at 2283.
232. Id. at 2282.
233. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2283.
234. Id. at 2283-84.
235. Id. at 2284.
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cate that certain state tax schemes did not interfere with U.S.
international commerce. 36 Congress, the Court noted, did not
need to convey its intent to permit certain state practices with
the same unmistakable clarity required to permit state regula-
tions that discriminated against interstate commerce or other-
wise did not meet the requirements of the Complete Auto test.2 37
Drawing negative inferences from the same congressional ac-
tions on WWCR, highlighted when analyzing the preemption
question earlier in its opinion, the Court reasoned that Con-
gress's implicit approval2 8 of WWCR also demonstrated that Cal-
ifornia's franchise tax scheme did not interfere with the federal
regulation of international commerce.239
Finally, the majority rejected the argument that Executive
Branch opposition to the states' use of WWCR prohibited its
use. 2 ° The Supreme Court emphasized that the Constitution
expressly granted to Congress, and not the President, the for-
eign commerce power, and Congress had implicitly allowed
WWCR. 241  Thus, although the Executive Branch was opposed to
WWCR, its position was not determinative to a resolution of the
"one voice" issue.242 The majority concluded its opinion by em-
236. Id. at 2282-83.
237. Id. at 2282-83. The majority stated:
In both Wardair and [Container], the Court considered the one voice ar-
gument only after determining that the challenged state action was otherwise
constitutional. An important premise underlying both decisions is this: Con-
gress may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential; it need not
convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regula-
tion that discriminates against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short
under Complete Auto inspection.
Id. (citing Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1 (1986); Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1983)).
238. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2284.
239. Id. at 2284. The majority stated:
Given these indicia of Congress' willingness to tolerate States' worldwide
combined reporting mandates, even when those mandates are applied to for-
eign corporations and domestic corporations with foreign parents, we cannot
conclude that the foreign policy of the United States . . . is [so] seriously
threatened by California's practice as to warrant our intervention.
Id. (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983)).
240. Id. at 2285.
241. Id.
242. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2285. The Supreme Court stated that "Executive
Branch actions - press releases, letters, and amicus briefs -. . . are merely precatory" and
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phasizing the Supreme Court's lack of competence to resolve
the primarily political question of balancing the sovereign right
of the states to exercise their tax power against the federal gov-
ernment's conduct of international commerce.243
2. Minority Opinions
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stated
that the majority, in analyzing the "one voice" issue, should not
have inferred congressional acquiescence to worldwide unitary
taxation from Congress's failure to prohibit it.24" Justice Black-
mun concluded, however, that because Barclays was controlled
by the Supreme Court's earlier Container decision, and because
California's franchise tax did not impose an administrative bur-
den on non-U.S. parent MNCs, the tax did not violate the one
voice standard.245
Justice Scalia, in an opinion concurring in judgment, also
agreed that California's franchise tax did not violate the Coin-
"Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law
cannot render unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, Congressionally condoned,
use of worldwide combined reporting." Id. at 2286. The Court noted, however, that
"Congress may 'delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the
President' who 'also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Consti-
tution on him as the Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign af-
fairs.' " Id. (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 109 (1948)). The Court, however, declined to "consider the scope of the Presi-
dent's power to preempt state law pursuant to authority delegated by a statute or a
ratified treaty ... [or] whether the President may displace legally binding executive
agreements with foreign nations made in the 'absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority where he can only rely upon his own independent powers.' " Id.
(quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
243. Id. at 2284-85. The majority opinion stated:
This Court has no constitutional authority to make the policy judgments
essential to regulating foreign commerce and conducting foreign affairs. Mat-
ters relating to the conduct of foreign relations.., are so exclusively entrusted
to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
inquiry or interference. For this reason, Barclays' . . . argument that Califor-
nia's worldwide combined reporting requirement is unconstitutional because
it is likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign governments is directed to
the wrong forum. The judiciary is not vested with power to decide how to
balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the
United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.
Id. (citing Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
244. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2286.
245. Id. at 2287.
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merce Clause. 2 6 In Justice Scalia's view, dormant Commerce
Clause analysis was appropriate in only two circumstances: first,
where a state law facially discriminated against interstate or for-
eign commerce or, second, if the state law was indistinguishable
from a type of law previously invalidated by the Supreme
Court.2 4 7 Because neither of those circumstances were impli-
cated by California's franchise tax, Justice Scalia concluded
there was no Commerce Clause violationY a
In an opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, 49 con-
cluded that the application of California's franchise tax to Bar-
clays violated the Foreign Commerce Clause prohibition against
multiple taxation. 5 ° Justice O'Connor began by drawing a
sharp distinction between the application of WWCR-based tax
schemes to non-U.S. parent MNCs with U.S.-parent MNCs. 2 151 In
the U.S.-parent case, when the income of international affiliates
was subjected to multiple taxation, the incidence of multiple tax-
ation was ultimately borne by the U.S.-parent corporation. 52
Multiple taxation in this context was not unlawful because U.S.-
parent corporations are subject to full taxation regardless of
whether income is domestically or internationally generated.5 3
In contrast, when a WWCR-based tax was imposed on a non-U.S.
parent MNC, with both U.S. and non-U.S. affiliates, the inci-
dence of the resulting multiple taxation of non-U.S. source in-
come 2  was ultimately borne by a non-U.S. corporation, even
though the federal government and the states were entitled to
tax only income earned domestically.2 5 Because no judicial fo-
rum existed in the international context that could ensure that
non-U.S. parent MNCs were not subjected to multiple taxation,
Justice O'Connor reasoned that state taxes that led to multiple
taxation should on principle be invalidated under the Foreign
246. Id. (citing Itel Containers v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095, 1106-07 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2287.
250. Barclays IV, 114 S. Ct. at 2287-88.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2289.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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Commerce Clause. 56
In Barclays' case Justice O'Connor highlighted that ninety-
eight percent of its business was conducted outside the United
States.2 5 7 In addition justice O'Connor pointed out that the trial
court had made a finding that Barclays was subject to actual mul-
tiple taxation.25 8 Justice O'Connor, therefore, concluded that
because Barclays was a non-U.S. parent MNC the application of
California's WWCR-based franchise tax violated the Foreign
Commerce Clause prohibition against multiple taxation.
Justice O'Connor noted that although prohibiting WWCR
only in the non-U.S. parent MNC case would leave states free to
discriminate unfairly against U.S. parent MNCs, such a situation
was not unfair because U.S. MNCs had access to the political
process to seek redress from discriminatory state taxation. 59 In
contrast a corresponding remedy did not exist for non-U.S. par-
ent MNCs, thus justifying enhanced judicial protection.2 60
III. THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE STATES
FROM APPLYING WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION TO NON-
U.S. PARENT MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
The Barclays decision, while leaving the Interstate Com-
merce Clause framework intact, narrows the Foreign Commerce
Clause framework for reviewing state taxation schemes. This
deference to state discretion to devise their fiscal schemes re-
flects the Supreme Court's unwillingness to impose judicial solu-
tions to what are ultimately issues that must be resolved in the
political arena. Such deference on the issue of worldwide uni-
tary taxation is fully apposite since worldwide unitary taxation
implicates uniquely political questions of international affairs
and federalism which must be resolved by the political branches.
A. Impact on Commerce Clause Review of State Taxation
The substance of the Supreme Court's Interstate Commerce
Clause framework for reviewing state taxation schemes estab-
256. Barclays V, 114 S. Ct. at 2290.
257. Id. at 2288.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2289.
260. Id.
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lished in Complete Auto remains unchanged after the Barclays
opinion.2 61 However, the Supreme Court's application of For-
eign Commerce Clause principles, established in Japan Line26 2
and narrowed in Container,263 is further restricted in Barclays.
First, the Supreme Court's application of the multiple taxation
test indicates that in the future a state tax on corporate income
will only be struck down if multiple taxation is inevitable and can
also be avoided under an existing alternative taxation scheme.2 ' 4
Second, the Supreme Court appears to have established a "one
voice" standard under which state taxation will only be struck
down where Congress clearly manifests that a state tax measure
interferes with its commerce powers. 65 What precise factors the
Supreme Court will examine or consider significant in evaluat-
ing whether the federal commerce authority is threatened, how-
ever, is not made clear in the Barclays opinion. It appears that
although Japan Line and Container regarded the threat of retalia-
tion by U.S. trading partners as a factor indicating a state tax
infringed on the federal government's ability to speak with "one
voice" in international commerce, after Barclays the ,Supreme
Court will no longer examine such factors.266 The Supreme
Court made clear in Barclays that such issues are properly di-
rected towards Congress, the body best able to resolve these
uniquely political questions. 67 In addition, the Supreme Court
has also made clear that the Executive Branch has no constitu-
tional authority to pronounce federal commerce policy, and
demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to Congressional pro-
nouncements on issues of international commerce. 68
The refinement of the Foreign Commerce Clause standards
261. See supra notes 88-99, 210-24 and accompanying text (discussing Complete Auto
Interstate Commerce Clause review of state taxation and Supreme Court application in
Barclays).
262. See supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text (discussing Japan Line Foreign
Commerce Clause review of state taxation).
263. See supra notes 119-45 and accompanying text (discussing Container decision).
264. See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text (discussing. the Supreme
Courts application of multiple taxation test in Barclays).
265. See supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
analysis of the "one voice" issue in Barclays).
266. Id.
267. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's view
that it lacks authority to resolve external policy issues).
268. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Branch
authority to establish federal commerce policy).
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in Barclays creates a much higher burden for taxpayers to sus-
tain. The Court in Barclays has held that an income tax that re-
sulted in international multiple taxation of foreign-source in-
come received by a non-U.S. parent MNC was acceptable be-
cause the problem was not caused by California, and Congress
chose not to prohibit it. This holding demonstrates a very high
level of tolerance for state tax schemes.
B. Future Use of Worldwide Unitary Taxation by the States
In contradistinction to Container, which produced an imme-
diate reaction by many states that viewed WWCR as a cure for
their financial problems, Barclays is unlikely to lead to wide-
spread adoption of worldwide unitary taxation. The 1983
Container decision galvanized the business community into
united action against WWCR and led it to mount a concerted
political campaign against WWCR. 69 Under this concerted
pressure the WWCR states modified their unitary tax schemes to
mitigate the controversial aspects of its operation, most com-
monly through the adoption of "water's edge" legislation.27 °
California modified its worldwide unitary tax statute in 1986.71
269. McArthur & Houghton, supra note 2, at 179.
270. STATE AND LocAL. TAXATION, supra note 2, 8.16, at 8-185. Florida which had
adopted worldwide unitary taxation in 1983 in the wake of the Container decision re-
pealed it in 1984. Id. Arizona amended its corporate income tax statute in 1985 to
limit apportionment to U.S. water's edge income. Id. Oregon abandoned worldwide
unitary taxation in 1985 also. Id. By 1987 the majority of states which used worldwide
unitary taxation, including Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
and Utah had abandoned it. Id.
271. Eric J. Coffill, A Kinder Gentler "Water's Edge" Election: California Wards Off
Threat of U.K. Retaliation as Part of Comprehensive Business Incentive Tax Package, 7 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1049 (Oct. 25, 1993). In 1986, California passed legislation which pro-
vided that "qualified taxpayers" subject to state franchise taxes are allowed to establish
the state income tax base pursuant to a "water's edge" election that takes into account
only the income of certain related entities. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110(a) (West
1995). Only certain "qualified taxpayers" can make a "water's edge" election. Id.
§ 25110(a). A "qualified taxpayer" is a bank or corporation that consents to the
Franchise Tax Board taking depositions from key corporate personnel, the taking of
subpoenas duces tecum, the reasonable production of documents, and agrees that any
"functionally related dividends" received by the electing taxpayer will be treated as ap-
portionable business income. Id. § 25110(b) (2). A "qualified taxpayer" must agree to
pay an annual election fee equivalent to thirty-thousandths of 1% (or 0.0003) of the
sum of the taxpayer's California property, payroll, and sales. Id. § 25115(b). Taxpayers
making a "water's edge" election are required to file with the Franchise Tax Board a
"domestic disclosure spreadsheet," which describes the state tax reporting methods of
the taxpayer and its affiliates that are doing business in the United States. Id.
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Following criticism from governments and non-U.S. MNCs that
California's "water's edge" legislation did not proceed far
enough to address their concerns, the state again modified its
worldwide unitary tax statute in 1993.72 The adoption of
"water's edge" legislation was driven by a number of factors in-
cluding the recognition by the states that an aggressive assertion
of the right to use WWCR-based taxation was detrimental for the
local economy, 273 as well as state attempts to forestall possible
federal legislation limiting unitary taxation associated with deter-
mined pressure exerted by the Executive Branch. 274
§ 25401d(a). Finally the Franchise Tax Board is empowered to disregard a taxpayer's
election if the taxpayer fails to file a domestic disclosure spreadsheet or information
that was requested at an audit. Id. § 25401(b) (d). California's "water's edge" statute of
1986 in actual operation excluded from the worldwide unitary group only out-of-state
corporations having less that 20% of their operations in the United States. Ruurd G.
Leegstra et al., The Calfornia Water's-Edge Election, 14 INr'L TAx J. 101, 102 (1987); Rob-
ert K. Wiederstein, Comment, California and Unitary Taxation: The Continuing Saga, 3
IND. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 135 (1992).
272. Coffill, supra note 269, at 1052-53. In 1993, in response to several domestic
and international developments, California modified its "water's edge" legislation.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court asked the U.S. Solicitor General's office to file an amicus
brief in the Barclays case then pending before it. Id. at 1052. Faced with the possibili-
ties of either supporting California on worldwide unitary taxation, and probably pro-
voking an international trade/tax war with other countries, or reneging on a campaign
promise to support California in the Barclays' litigation by opposing worldwide unitary
taxation, the request for the amicus brief placed the Clinton administration in an acute
political dilemma. Id. Second, in May 1993 the British Chancellor of the Exchequer
threatened that the United Kingdom would take retaliatory measures against U.S. com-
panies operating in the United Kingdom if the unitary taxation problem was not solved.
Id. California's changes to its "water's edge" election were designed to avert the threat
of impending British retaliation and to resolve the Clinton administration's political
problems. Id. These changes became effective on January 1, 1994. Id. at 1055. The
major changes made to the "water's edge" scheme included, first, the elimination of
election fees. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 25111(a) (West 1995). Second, a taxpayer mak-
ing an election no longer has to file a domestic disclosure spreadsheet. Id. Third, the
election is for an initial term of seven years. Id. Finally, the Franchise Tax Board lacks
the power to disregard a "water's edge" election. Id. § 25111(c).
273. See, e.g., STATE AND LOCAL TAxATION, supra note 2, 8.16, at 8-186. For exam-
ple Oregon, in the face of intense pressure by Japanese businesses in particular,
amended its worldwide unitary tax statutes to comply with the "water's edge" restriction.
Id. Japanese businesses declared that they would not make new investments or expand
existing plants in the state if worldwide unitary taxation was applied to them. Id. at
8.16, at 8-186 (citing THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 20, 1984).
274. See STATE AND Lo. AL TAxATnON, supra note 2, 1 8.16, at 8-185. Following the
Container decision, the Reagan administration established the Worldwide Unitary Taxa-
tion Working Group headed by Donald Regan, then Secretary of the Treasure, to re-
view worldwide apportionment. Id. The 1984 Working Group Report recommended
that the states adopt water's edge legislation for both U.S. and non-U.S. parent MNCs.
Id. More forcefully, the Working Group Report recommended that in the event that
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Similarly, after 1994 the states are faced with few legal im-
pediments to adopting worldwide unitary taxation. Barclays,
however, will likely not be embraced by the states with the same
enthusiasm as was Container. The probable reigniting of hostili-
ties by the business community against any attempt to restore
WWCR-based taxation will restrict the states' readoption of
WWCR.
C. The Supreme Court Correctly Resolved the Worldwide Unitay
Taxation Problem
The Barclays decision reconfirms the Supreme Court's gen-
eral unwillingness to impose judicially crafted solutions to the
commerce clause aspects of the worldwide unitary taxation dis-
pute earlier demonstrated in Container.7 5 Suchjudicial restraint
is appropriate because the division of income disputes with re-
spect to non-U.S. parent MNCs was a uniquely political issue that
brought into conflict the extensive fiscal authority vested in the
states against the federal government's enumerated powers to
regulate international commerce. The Supreme Court early on
correctly recognized that any durable solution to the problem
necessarily had to come from the political arena.2 7' Develop-
ments since the Container decision have borne out the validity of
this general stance and support the ultimate holding in Bar-
clays.2 77 Worldwide unitary taxation was a political problem. As
such it was rightly resolved in the political arena.
CONCLUSION
After 1983 the one remaining avenue open under the Com-
merce Clause for MNCs to challenge worldwide unitary taxation
was the reserved issue in Container - the possible unconstitu-
tionality of applying WWCR-based taxation to non-U.S. parent
MNCs. By deciding in Barclays that the application of WWCR to
such legislation was not adopted, federal legislation requiring such limitations should
be enacted. Id.
275. See supra note 139 (setting forth Supreme Court's view expressed in Container
that it has no authority to decide sensitive issues of international relations).
276. See supra note 139 (setting forth Supreme Court's view expressed in Container
that it has no authority to decide sensitive issues of international relations).
277. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text (discussing political pressure
placed on states to modify worldwide unitary taxation legislation and adoption of
"water's edge" legislation).
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non-U.S. parent MNCs does not violate the Commerce Clause
the Court has completed the constitutional analysis applicable to
worldwide unitary taxation. The Court has also removed the last
Commerce Clause hurdle to the states' use of WWCR-based taxa-
tion, but because political and economic imperatives are aligned
against worldwide unitary taxation it is unlikely that the states
will implement such taxation laws in the wake of Barclays.
